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Abstract
Computers and Thought are the two categories that together dene Articial Intelligence as a discipline. It
is generally accepted that work in Articial Intelligence over the last thirty years has had a strong inuence
on aspects of computer architectures. In this paper we also make the converse claim; that the state of
computer architecture has been a strong inuence on our models of thought. The Von Neumann model
of computation has lead Articial Intelligence in particular directions. Intelligence in biological systems
is completely dierent. Recent work in behavior-based Articial Intelligence has produced new models of
intelligence that are much closer in spirit to biological systems. The non-Von Neumann computational
models they use share many characteristics with biological computation.
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1 Introduction
Articial Intelligence as a formal discipline has been
around for a little over thirty years. The goals of in-
dividual practitioners vary and change over time. A
reasonable characterization of the general eld is that
it is intended to make computers do things, that when
done by people, are described as having indicated intel-
ligence. Winston [Winston 84] characterizes the goals
of Articial Intelligence as both the construction of use-
ful intelligent systems and the understanding of human
intelligence.
There is a temptation (often succumbed to) to then
go ahead and dene intelligence, but that does not im-
mediately give a clearly grounded meaning to the eld.
In fact there is danger of deep philosophical regress with
no recovery. Therefore I prefer to stay with a more in-
formal notion of intelligence being the sort of stu that
humans do, pretty much all the time.
1.1 Approaches
Traditional Articial Intelligence has tried to tackle the
problem of building articially intelligent systems from
the top down. It tackled intelligence through the notions
of thought and reason. These are things we only know
about through introspection. The eld has adopted a
certain modus operandi over the years, which includes a
particular set of conventions on how the inputs and out-
puts to thought and reasoning are to be handled (e.g.,
the subeld of knowledge representation), and the sorts
of things that thought and reasoning do (e.g., planning,
problem solving, etc.). I will argue that these conven-
tions cannot account for large aspects of what goes into
intelligence. Furthermore, without those aspects the va-
lidity of the traditional Articial Intelligence approaches
comes into question. I will also argue that much of the
landmark work on thought has been inuenced by the
technological constraints of the available computers, and
thereafter these consequences have often mistakenly be-
come enshrined as principles, long after the original im-
petus has disappeared.
From an evolutionary stance, human level intelligence
did not suddenly leap onto the scene. There were pre-
cursors and foundations throughout the lineage to hu-
mans. Much of this substrate is present in other animals
today. The study of that substrate may well provide
constraints on how higher level thought in humans could
be organized.
Recently there has been a movement to study intel-
ligence from the bottom up, concentrating on physical
systems (e.g., mobile robots), situated in the world, au-
tonomously carrying out tasks of various sorts. Some of
this work is based on engineering from rst principles,
other parts of the work are rmly based on biological in-
spirations. The avor of this work is quite dierent from
that of traditional Articial Intelligence. In fact it sug-
gests that despite our best introspections, traditional Ar-
ticial Intelligence oers solutions to intelligence which
bear almost no resemblance at all to how biological sys-
tems work.
There are of course dangers in studying biological sys-
tems too closely. Their design was not highly optimized
from a global systems point of view. Rather they were
patched together and adapted from previously working
systems, in ways which most expeditiously met the latest
environmental pressures. Perhaps the solutions found for
much of intelligence are terribly suboptimal. Certainly
there are many vestigial structures surviving within hu-
mans' and other animals' digestive, skeletal, and mus-
cular systems. One should suppose then that there are
many vestigial neurological structures, interactions, and
side eects. Their emulation may be a distraction.
1.2 Outline
The body of this paper is formed by ve main sections:
2 Robots, 3 Computers, 4 Biology, 5 Ideas and 6 Thought.
The theme of the paper is how computers and thought
have be intimately intertwined in the development of Ar-
ticial Intelligence, how those connections may have led
the eld astray, how biological examples of intelligence
are quite dierent from the models used by Articial
Intelligence, and how recent new approaches point to
another path for both computers and thought.
The new approaches that have been developed re-
cently for Articial Intelligence arose out of work with
mobile robots. Section 2 (Robots) briey outlines the
context within which this work arose, and discusses some
key realizations made by the researchers involved.
Section 3 (Computers) traces the development of the
foundational ideas for Articial Intelligence, and how
they were intimately linked to the technology avail-
able for computation. Neither situatedness nor embod-
iment were easy to include on the original agenda, al-
though their importance was recognized by many early
researchers. The early framework with its emphasis on
search has remained dominant, and has led to solutions
that seem important within the closed world of Articial
Intelligence, but which perhaps are not very relevant to
practical applications. The eld of Cybernetics with a
heritage of very dierent tools from the early digital com-
puter, provides an interesting counterpoint, conrming
the hypothesis that models of thought are intimately tied
to the available models of computation.
Section 4 (Biology) is a brief overview of recent devel-
opments in the understanding of biological intelligence.
It covers material from ethology, psychology, and neu-
roscience. Of necessity it is not comprehensive, but it
is sucient to demonstrate that the intelligence of bio-
logical systems is organized in ways quite dierent from
traditional views of Articial Intelligence.
Section 5 (Ideas) introduces the two cornerstones to
the new approach to Articial Intelligence, situatedness
and embodiment, and discusses both intelligence and
emergence in these contexts.
The last major section, 6 (Thought), outlines some
details of the approach of my group at MIT to build-
ing complete situated, embodied, articially intelligent
robots. This approach shares much more heritage with
biological systems than with what is usually called Ar-
ticial Intelligence.
1
2 Robots
There has been a scattering of work with mobile robots
within the Articial Intelligence community over the
years. Shakey from the late sixties at SRI (see [Nils-
son 84] for a collection of original reports) is perhaps
the best known, but other signicant eorts include the
CART ([Moravec 82]) at Stanford and Hilare ([Giralt,
Chatila and Vaisset 84]) in Toulouse.
All these systems used oboard computers (and thus
they could be the largest most powerful computers avail-
able at the time and place), and all operated in mostly
1
static environments. All of these robots operated in en-
vironments that at least to some degree had been spe-
cially engineered for them. They all sensed the world
and tried to build two or three dimensional world mod-
els of it. Then, in each case, a planner could ignore the
actual world, and operate in the model to produce a plan
of action for the robot to achieve whatever goal it had
been given. In all three of these robots, the generated
plans included at least a nominal path through the world
model along which it was intended that the robot should
move.
Despite the simplications (static, engineered envi-
ronments, and the most powerful available computers)
all these robots operated excruciatingly slowly. Much
of the processing time was consumed in the perceptual
end of the systems and in building the world models.
Relatively little computation was used in planning and
acting.
An important eect of this work was to provide a
framework within which other researchers could operate
without testing their ideas on real robots, and even with-
out having any access to real robot data. We will call
this framework, the sense-model-plan-act framework, or
SMPA for short. See section 3.6 for more details of how
the SMPA framework inuenced the manner in which
robots were built over the following years, and how those
robots in turn imposed restrictions on the ways in which
intelligent control programs could be built for them.
There was at least an implicit assumption in this early
work with mobile robots, that once the simpler case of
operating in a static environment had been solved, then
the more dicult case of an actively dynamic environ-
ment could be tackled. None of these early SMPA sys-
tems were ever extended in this way.
Around 1984, a number of people started to worry
about the more general problem of organizing intelli-
gence. There was a requirement that intelligence be
reactive to dynamic aspects of the environment, that
a mobile robot operate on time scales similar to those
1
In the case of Shakey, experiments included the existence
of a gremlin who would secretly come and alter the environ-
ment by moving a block to a dierent location. However,
this would usually happen only once, say, in a many hour
run, and the robot would not perceive the dynamic act, but
rather might later notice a changed world if the change was
directly relevant to the particular subtask it was executing.
In the case of the CART, the only dynamic aspect of the
world was the change in sun angle over long time periods,
and this in fact caused the robot to fail as its position esti-
mation scheme was confused by the moving shadows.
of animals and humans, and that intelligence be able
to generate robust behavior in the face of uncertain sen-
sors, an unpredicted environment, and a changing world.
Some of the key realizations about the organization of
intelligence were as follows:
 Most of what people do in their day to day lives
is not problem-solving or planning, but rather it
is routine activity in a relatively benign, but cer-
tainly dynamic, world. Furthermore the represen-
tations an agent uses of objects in the world need
not rely on a semantic correspondence with sym-
bols that the agent possesses, but rather can be
dened through interactions of the agent with the
world. Agents based on these ideas have achieved
interesting performance levels and were built from
combinatorial circuits plus a little timing circuitry
([Agre and Chapman 87], [Agre and Chap-
man 90]).
 An observer can legitimately talk about an agent's
beliefs and goals, even though the agent need
not manipulate symbolic data structures at run
time. A formal grounding in semantics used for the
agent's design can be compiled away. Agents based
on these ideas have achieved interesting perfor-
mance levels and were built from combinatorial cir-
cuits plus a little timing circuitry ([Rosenschein
and Kaelbling 86], [Kaelbling and Rosen-
schein 90]).
 In order to really test ideas of intelligence it is im-
portant to build complete agents which operate in
dynamic environments using real sensors. Internal
world models which are complete representations
of the external environment, besides being impos-
sible to obtain, are not at all necessary for agents to
act in a competent manner. Many of the actions of
an agent are quite separable|coherent intelligence
can emerge from subcomponents interacting in the
world. Agents based on these ideas have achieved
interesting performance levels and were built from
combinatorial circuits plus a little timing circuitry
([Brooks 86], [Brooks 90b], [Brooks 91a]).
A large number of others have also contributed to this
approach to organizing intelligence. [Maes 90a] is the
most representative collection.
There is no generally accepted term to describe this
style of work. It has sometimes been characterized by
the oxymoron reactive planning. I have variously used
Robot Beings [Brooks and Flynn 89] and Articial
Creatures [Brooks 90b]. Related work on non-mobile,
but nevertheless active, systems has been called active
vision, or animate vision [Ballard 89]. Some workers
refer to their beings, or creatures, as agents; unfortu-
nately that term is also used by others to refer to some-
what independent components of intelligence within a
single physical creature (e.g., the agencies of [Minsky
86]). Sometimes the approach is called behavior-based as
the computational components tend to be direct behav-
ior producing modules
2
. For the remainder of this paper,
2
Unfortunately this clashes a little with the meaning of
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we will simply call the entities of discussion `robots' or
`behavior-based robots'.
There are a number of key aspects characterizing this
style of work.
 [Situatedness] The robots are situated in the
world|they do not deal with abstract descriptions,
but with the here and now of the world directly in-
uencing the behavior of the system.
 [Embodiment] The robots have bodies and ex-
perience the world directly|their actions are part
of a dynamic with the world and have immediate
feedback on their own sensations.
 [Intelligence] They are observed to
be intelligent|but the source of intelligence is not
limited to just the computational engine. It also
comes from the situation in the world, the signal
transformations within the sensors, and the physi-
cal coupling of the robot with the world.
 [Emergence] The intelligence of the system
emerges from the system's interactions with the
world and from sometimes indirect interactions be-
tween its components|it is sometimes hard to
point to one event or place within the system and
say that is why some external action was mani-
fested.
Recently there has been a trend to try to integrate
traditional symbolic reasoning, on top of a purely reac-
tive system, both with real robots (e.g., [Arkin 90],
[Mitchell 90],) and in simulation (e.g, [Firby 89]).
The idea is that the reactive system handles the real-
time issues of being embedded in the world, while the
deliberative system does the `hard' stu traditionally
imagined to be handled by an Articial Intelligence sys-
tem. I think that these approaches are suering from
the well known `horizon eect'|they have bought a lit-
tle better performance in their overall system with the
reactive component, but they have simply pushed the
limitations of the reasoning system a bit further into the
future. I will not be concerned with such systems for the
remainder of this paper.
Before examining this work in greater detail, we will
turn to the reasons why traditional Articial Intelligence
adopted such a dierent approach.
3 Computers
In evolution there is a theory [Gould and Eldredge
77] of punctuated equilibria, where most of the time
there is little change within a species, but at intervals a
subpopulation branches o with a short burst of greatly
accelerated changes. Likewise, I believe that in Articial
Intelligence research over the last forty or so years, there
have been long periods of incremental work within estab-
lished guidelines, and occasionally a shift in orientation
and assumptions causing a new subeld to branch o.
The older work usually continues, sometimes remaining
behavior as used by ethologists as an observed interaction
with the world, rather than as something explicitly generated.
strong, and sometimes dying o gradually. This descrip-
tion of the eld also ts more general models of science,
such as [Kuhn 70].
The point of this section is that all those steady-
state bodies of work rely, sometimes implicitly, on cer-
tain philosophical and technological assumptions. The
founders of the bodies of work are quite aware of these
assumptions, but over time as new people come into the
elds, these assumptions get lost, forgotten, or buried,
and the work takes on a life of its own for its own sake.
In this section I am particularly concerned with how
the architecture of our computers inuences our choice
of problems on which to work, our models of thought,
and our algorithms, and how the problems on which we
work, our models of thought, and our algorithm choice
puts pressure on the development of architectures of our
computers.
Biological systems run on massively parallel, low
speed computation, within an essentially xed topology
network with bounded depth. Almost all Articial Intel-
ligence research, and indeed almost all modern compu-
tation, runs on essentially Von Neumann architectures,
with a large, inactive memory which can respond at very
high speed over an extremely narrow channel, to a very
high speed central processing unit which contains very
little state. When connections to sensors and actuators
are also considered, the gap between biological systems
and our articial systems widens.
Besides putting architectural constraints on our pro-
grams, even our mathematical tools are strongly inu-
enced by our computational architectures. Most algo-
rithmic analysis is based on the RAM model of com-
putation (essentially a Von Neumann model, shown to
be polynomially equivalent to a Turing machine, e.g.,
[Hartmanis 71]). Only in recent years have more gen-
eral models gained prominence, but they have been in
the direction of oracles, and other improbable devices
for our robot beings.
Are we doomed to work forever within the current
architectural constraints?
Over the past few centuries computation technology
has progressed from making marks on various surfaces
(chiselling, writing, etc.), through a long evolutionary
chain of purely mechanical systems, then electromechan-
ical relay based systems, through vacuum tube based de-
vices, followed by an evolutionary chain of silicon-based
devices to the current state of the art.
It would be the height of arrogance and foolishness to
assume that we are now using the ultimate technology for
computation, namely silicon based integrated circuits,
just as it would have been foolish (at least in retrospect)
to assume in the 16th century that Napier's Bones were
the ultimate computing technology [Williams 83]. In-
deed the end of the exponential increase in computation
speed for uni-processors is in sight, forcing somewhat the
large amount of research into parallel approaches to more
computation for the dollar, and per second. But there
are other more radical possibilities for changes in compu-
tation infrastructure
3
. These include computation based
3
Equally radical changes have occurred in the past, but
admittedly they happened well before the current high levels
3
on optical switching ([Gibbs 85], [Brady 90]), protein
folding, gene expression, non-organic atomic switching.
3.1 Prehistory
During the early 1940's even while the second world war
was being waged, and the rst electronic computers were
being built for cryptanalysis and trajectory calculations,
the idea of using computers to carry out intelligent ac-
tivities was already on people's minds.
Alan Turing, already famous for his work on com-
putability [Turing 37] had discussions with Donald
Michie, as early as 1943, and others less known to the
modern Articial Intelligence world as early as 1941,
about using a computer to play chess. He and others
developed the idea of minimaxing a tree of moves, and
of static evaluation, and carried out elaborate hand sim-
ulations against human opponents. Later (during the
period from 1945 to 1950 at least) he and Claude Shan-
non communicated about these ideas
4
. Although there
was already an established eld of mathematics concern-
ing a theory of games, pioneered by Von Neumann [Von
Neumann and Morgenstern 44], chess had such a
large space of legal positions, that even though every-
thing about it is deterministic, the theories were not
particularly applicable. Only heuristic and operational
programs seemed plausible means of attack.
In a paper titled Intelligent Machinery, written in
1948
5
, but not published until long after his death [Tur-
ing 70], Turing outlined a more general view of mak-
ing computers intelligent. In this rather short insight-
ful paper he foresaw many modern developments and
techniques. He argued (somewhat whimsically, to the
annoyance of his employers [Hodges 83]) for at least
some elds of intelligence, and his particular example is
the learning of languages, that the machine would have
to be embodied, and claimed success \seems however to
depend rather too much on sense organs and locomotion
to be feasible".
Turing argued that it must be possible to build a
thinking machine since it was possible to build imitations
of \any small part of a man". He made the distinction
between producing accurate electrical models of nerves,
and replacing them computationally with the available
technology of vacuum tube circuits (this follows directly
from his earlier paper [Turing 37]), and the assump-
tion that the nervous system can be modeled as a com-
putational system. For other parts of the body he sug-
gests that \television cameras, microphones, loudspeak-
ers", etc., could be used to model the rest of the system.
\This would be a tremendous undertaking of course."
Even so, Turing notes that the so constructed machine
of installed base of silicon-based computers.
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Norbert Wiener also outlines the idea of minimax in the
nal note of the original edition of [Wiener 48]. However
he restricts the idea to a depth of two or three plays|one
assumes for practical reasons, as he does express the general
notion for n plays. See Section 3.3 for more details on the
ways in which cybernetic models of thought were restricted
by the computational models at hand.
5
Dierent sources cite 1947 and 1948 as the time of
writing.
\would still have no contact with food, sex, sport and
many other things of interest to the human being". Tur-
ing concludes that the best domains in which to explore
the mechanization of thought are various games, and
cryptanalysis, \in that they require little contact with
the outside world"
6
.
Turing thus carefully considered the question of em-
bodiment, and for technical reasons chose to pursue as-
pects of intelligence which could be viewed, at least in
his opinion, as purely symbolic. Minimax search, aug-
mented with the idea of pursuing chains of capture to
quiescence, and clever static evaluation functions (the
Turochamp system of David Champernowne and Alan
Turing
7
, [Shannon 50]) soon became the dominant ap-
proach to the problem. [Newell, Shaw and Simon
58] compared all four known implemented chess playing
programs of 1958 (with a total combined experience of
six games played), including Turochamp, and they all
followed this approach.
The basic approach of minimax with a good static
evaluation function has not changed to this day. Pro-
grams of this ilk compete well with International Grand
Masters. The best of them, Deep Thought [Hsu, Anan-
tharaman, Campbell and Nowatzyk 90], uses spe-
cial purpose chips for massive search capabilities, along
with a skillful evaluation scheme and selective deepening
to direct that search better than in previous programs.
Although Turing had conceived of using chess as a
vehicle for studying human thought processes, this no-
tion has largely gotten lost along the way (there are of
course exceptions, e.g., [Wilkins 79] describes a system
which substitutes chess knowledge for search in the mid-
dle game|usually there are very few static evaluations,
and tree search is mainly to conrm or deny the existence
of a mate). Instead the driving force has always been
performance, and the most successful program of the
day has usually relied on technological advances. Brute
force tree search has been the dominant method, itself
dominated by the amount of bruteness available. This in
turn has been a product of clever harnessing of the latest
technology available. Over the years, the current `cham-
pion' program has capitalized on the available hardware.
MacHack-6 [Greenblatt, Eastlake and Crocker 67]
made use of the largest available fast memory (256K 36
bits words|about a megabyte or so, or $45 by today's
standards) and a new comprehensive architecture (the
PDP-6) largely inuenced by Minsky and McCarthy's re-
quirements for Lisp and symbolic programming. Chess
4.0 and its descendants [Slate and Atkin 84] relied
on the running on the world's faster available computer.
Belle [Condon and Thompson 84] used a smaller cen-
tral computer, but had a custom move generator, built
from LSI circuits. Deep Thought, mentioned above as
the most recent champion, relies on custom VLSI cir-
6
Interestingly, Turing did not completely abstract even a
chess playing machine away from embodiment, commenting
that \its only organs need be `eyes' capable of distinguishing
the various positions on a specially made board, and means
for announcing its own moves".
7
See Personal Computing January 1980, pages 80{81, for
a description of this hand simulation of a chess machine.
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cuits to handle its move generation and tree search. It
is clear that the success and progress in chess playing
programs has been driven by technology enabling large
tree searches. Few would argue that today's chess pro-
grams/hardware systems are very good models for gen-
eral human thought processes.
There were some misgivings along the way, however.
In an early paper [Selfridge 56] argues that better
static evaluation is the key to playing chess, so that look-
ahead can be limited to a single move except in situations
close to mate (and one assumes he would include situ-
ations where there is capture, and perhaps exchanges,
involved). But, he claims that humans come to chess
with a signicant advantage over computers (the thrust
of the paper is on learning, and in this instance on learn-
ing to play chess) as they have concepts such as `value',
`double threat', the `centre' etc., already formed. Chess
to Selfridge is not a disembodied exercise, but one where
successful play is built upon a richness of experience in
other, perhaps simpler, situations.
There is an interesting counterpoint to the history of
computer chess; the game of Go. The search tree for Go
is much much larger than for chess, and a good static
evaluation function is much harder to dene. Go has
never worked out well as a vehicle for research in com-
puter game playing|any reasonable crack at it is much
more likely to require techniques much closer to those
of human thought|mere computer technology advances
are not going to bring the minimax approach close to
success in this domain (see [Campbell 83] for a brief
overview).
Before leaving Turing entirely there is one other rather
signicant contribution he made to the eld which in
a sense he predated. In [Turing 50] poses the ques-
tion \Can machines think?". To tease out an acceptable
meaning for this question he presented what has come
to be known as the Turing test, where a person com-
municates in English over a teletype with either another
person or a computer. The goal is to guess whether it
is a person or a computer at the other end. Over time
this test has come to be an informal goal of Articial
Intelligence
8
. Notice that it is a totally disembodied view
of intelligence, although it is somewhat situated in that
the machine has to respond in a timely fashion to its in-
terrogator. Turing suggests that the machine should try
to simulate a person by taking extra time and making
mistakes with arithmetic problems. This is the version
of the Turing test that is bandied around by current day
Articial Intelligence researchers
9
.
Turing advances a number of strawman arguments
against the case that a digital computer might one day
be able to pass this test, but he does not consider the
need that the machine be fully embodied. In principle,
of course, he is right. But how a machine might be then
programmed is a question. Turing provides an argu-
8
Turing expresses his own belief that it will be possible for
a machine with 10
9
bits of store to pass a ve minute version
of the test with 70% probability by about the year 2000.
9
In fact there is a yearly competition with a $100; 000
prize for a machine that can pass this version of the Turing
test.
ment that programming the machine by hand would be
impractical, so he suggests having it learn. At this point
he brings up the need to embody the machine in some
way. He rejects giving it limbs, but suspects that eyes
would be good, although not entirely necessary. At the
end of the paper he proposes two possible paths towards
his goal of a \thinking" machine. The unembodied path
is to concentrate on programming intellectual activities
like chess, while the embodied approach is to equip a
digital computer \with the best sense organs that money
can buy, and then teach it to understand and speak En-
glish". Articial Intelligence followed the former path,
and has all but ignored the latter approach
10
.
3.2 Establishment
The establishment of Articial Intelligence as a disci-
pline that is clearly the foundation of today's discipline
by that name occurred during the period from the fa-
mous `Dartmouth Conference' of 1956 through the pub-
lication of the book \Computers and Thought" in 1963
([Feigenbaum and Feldman 63]).
Named and mostly organized by John McCarthy as
\The Dartmouth Summer Research Project on Arti-
cial Intelligence" the six-week long workshop brought
together those who would establish and lead the major
Articial Intelligence research centers in North America
for the next twenty years. McCarthy jointly established
the MIT Articial Intelligence Laboratory with Marvin
Minsky, and then went on to found the Stanford Arti-
cial Intelligence Laboratory. Allen Newell and Herbert
Simon shaped and lead the group that turned into the
Computer Science department at Carnegie-Mellon Uni-
versity. Even today a large portion of the researchers in
Articial Intelligence in North America had one of these
four people on their doctoral committee, or were advised
by someone who did. The ideas expressed at the Dart-
mouth meeting have thus had a signal impact upon the
eld rst named there.
As can be seen from interviews of the participants
published in [McCorduck 79] there is still some
disagreement over the intellectual property that was
brought to the conference and its relative signicance.
The key outcome was the acceptance and rise of search
as the pre-eminent tool of Articial Intelligence. There
was a general acceptance of the use of search to solve
problems, and with this there was an essential abandon-
ment of any notion of situatedness.
Minsky's earlier work had been involved with neural
modeling. His Ph.D. thesis at Princeton was concerned
with a model for the brain [Minsky 54]. Later, while
at Harvard he was strongly inuenced by McCulloch and
Pitts (see [McCulloch and Pitts 43]), but by the time
of the Dartmouth meeting he had become more involved
with symbolic search-based systems. In his collection
[Minsky 68] of versions of his students' Ph.D. theses,
all were concerned to some degree with dening and con-
trolling an appropriate search space.
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An excerpt from Turing's paper is reprinted in [Hofs-
tadter and Dennett 81]. They leave out the whole section
on learning and embodiment.
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Simon and Newell presented their recent work on the
Logic Theorist [Newell, Shaw and Simon 57], a pro-
gram that proved logic theorems by searching a tree of
subgoals. The program made extensive use of heuristics
to prune its search space. With this success, the idea of
heuristic search soon became dominant within the still
tiny Articial Intelligence community.
McCarthy was not so aected by the conference that
he had organized, and continues to this day to concen-
trate on epistemological issues rather than performance
programs. However he was soon to invent the Lisp pro-
gramming language [McCarthy 1960] which became
the standard model of computation for Articial Intelli-
gence. It had great inuence on the models of thought
that were popular however, as it made certain things
such as search, and representations based on individu-
als, much easier to program.
At the time, most programs were written in assem-
bly language. It was a tedious job to write search
procedures, especially recursive procedures in the ma-
chine languages of the day, although some people such
as [Samuel 59] (another Dartmouth participant) were
spectacularly successful. Newell and Simon owed much
of their success in developing the Logic Theorist and
their later General Problem Solver [Newell, Shaw and
Simon 59], to their use of an interpreted language (IPL-
V|see [Newell, Shaw and Simon 61]) which sup-
ported complex list structures and recursion. Many of
their student's projects reported in [Feigenbaum and
Feldman 63] also used this language.
McCarthy's Lisp was much cleaner and simpler. It
made processing lists of information and recursive tree
searches trivial to program{often a dozen lines of code
could replace many hundreds of lines of assembler code.
Search procedures now became even easier and more
convenient to include in Articial Intelligence programs.
Lisp also had an inuence on the classes of representa-
tional systems used, as is described in section 3.5.
In [Minsky 61], Articial Intelligence was broken
into ve key topics: search, pattern recognition, learn-
ing, planning and induction. The second through fourth
of these were characterized as ways of controlling search
(respectively by better selection of tree expansion oper-
ators, by directing search through previous experience,
and by replacing a given search with a smaller and more
appropriate exploration). Again, most of the serious
work in Articial Intelligence according to this break-
down was concerned with search.
Eventually, after much experimentation [Michie and
Ross 70], search methods became well understood, for-
malized, and analyzed [Knuth and Moore 75], and
became celebrated as the primary method of Articial
Intelligence [Nilsson 71].
At the end of the era of establishment, in 1963,
Minsky generated an exhaustive annotated bibliography
([Minsky 63]) of literature \directly concerned with
construction of articial problem-solving systems"
11
. It
contains 925 citations, 890 of which are to scientic pa-
pers and books, and 35 of which are to collections of
11
It also acted as the combined bibliography for the papers
in [Feigenbaum and Feldman 63].
such papers. There are two main points of interest here.
First, although the title of the bibliography, \A Selected
Descriptor-Indexed Bibliography to the Literature on
Articial Intelligence", refers to Articial Intelligence,
in his introduction he refers to the area of concern as
\articial problem-solving systems". Second, and some-
what paradoxically, the scope of the bibliography is much
broader than one would expect from an Articial Intel-
ligence bibliography today. It includes many items on
cybernetics, neuroscience, bionics, information and com-
munication theory, and rst generation connectionism.
These two contrasting aspects of the bibliography
highlight a trend in Articial Intelligence that contin-
ued for the next 25 years. Out of a soup of ideas on
how to build intelligent machines the disembodied and
non-situated approach of problem-solving search systems
emerged as dominant, at least within the community
that referred to its own work as Articial Intelligence.
With hindsight we can step back and look at what
happened. Originally search was introduced as a mech-
anism for solving problems that arguably humans used
some search in solving. Chess and logic theorem proving
are two examples we have already discussed. In these do-
mains one does not expect instantaneous responses from
humans doing the same tasks. They are not tasks that
are situated in the world.
One can debate whether even in these tasks it is wise
to rely so heavily on search, as bigger problems will
have exponentially bad eects on search time|in fact
[Newell, Shaw and Simon 58] argue just this, but
produced a markedly slower chess program because of
the complexity of static evaluation and search control.
Some, such as [Samuel 59] with his checker's play-
ing program, did worry about keeping things on a hu-
man timescale. [Slagle 63] in his symbolic integration
program, was worried about being economically com-
petitive with humans, but as he points out in the last
two paragraphs of his paper, the explosive increase in
price/performance ratio for computing was able to keep
his programs ahead. In general, performance increases in
computers were able to feed researchers with a steadily
larger search space, enabling them to feel that they were
making progress as the years went by. For any given
technology level, a long-term freeze would soon show
that programs relying on search had very serious prob-
lems, especially if there was any desire to situate them
in a dynamic world.
In the last paragraph of [Minsky 61] he does bring
up the possibility of a situated agent, acting as a \think-
ing aid" to a person. But again he relies on a perfor-
mance increase in standard computing methods (this
time through the introduction of time sharing) to supply
the necessary time relevant computations.
In the early days of the formal discipline of Articial
Intelligence, search was adopted as a basic technology.
It was easy to program on digital computers. It lead to
reasoning systems which are not easy to shoe-horn into
situated agents.
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3.3 Cybernetics
There was, especially in the forties and fties, another
discipline which could be viewed as having the same
goals as we have identied for Articial Intelligence|the
construction of useful intelligent systems and the under-
standing of human intelligence. This work, known as
Cybernetics, had a fundamentally dierent avor from
the today's traditional Articial Intelligence.
Cybernetics co-evolved with control theory and sta-
tistical information theory|e.g., see [Wiener 48, 61].
It is the study of the mathematics of machines, not in
terms of the functional components of a machine and
how they are connected, and not in terms of what an
individual machine can do here and now, and but rather
in terms of all the possible behaviors that an individ-
ual machine can produce. There was a strong emphasis
on characterizing a machine in terms of its inputs and
outputs, and treating it as a black box as far as its inter-
nal workings were unobservable. The tools of analysis
were often dierential or integral equations, and these
tools inherently limited cybernetics to situations where
the boundary conditions were not changing rapidly. In
contrast, they often do so in a system situated in a dy-
namically changing world|that complexity needs to go
somewhere; either into discontinuous models or changed
boundary conditions.
Cybernetics arose in the context of regulation of ma-
chinery and electronic circuits|it is often characterized
by the subtitle of Wiener's book as the study of \con-
trol and communication in the animal and the machine".
The model of computation at the time of its original de-
velopment was analog. The inputs to and outputs from
the machine to be analyzed were usually thought of as
almost everywhere continuous functions with reasonable
derivatives, and the mechanisms for automated analysis
and modeling were usually things that today would be
characterized as analog components. As such there was
no notion of symbolic search|any search was couched
in terms of minimization of a function. There was also
much less of a notion of representation as an abstract
manipulable entity than was found in the Articial In-
telligence approaches.
Much of the work in Cybernetics really was aimed at
understanding animals and intelligence. Animals were
modeled as machines, and from those models, it was
hoped to glean how the animals changed their behav-
ior through learning, and how that lead to better adap-
tation to the environment for the whole organism. It
was recognized rather early (e.g., [Ashby 52] for an ex-
plicit statement) that an organism and its environment
must be modeled together in order to understand the
behavior produced by the organism|this is clearly an
expression of situatedness. The tools of feedback analy-
sis were used ([Ashby 56]) to concentrate on such issues
as stability of the system as the environment was per-
turbed, and in particular a system's homeostasis or abil-
ity to keep certain parameters within prescribed ranges,
no matter what the uncontrolled variations within the
environment.
With regards to embodiment there were some exper-
iments along these lines. Many cybernetic models of
organisms were rather abstract demonstrations of home-
ostasis, but some were concerned with physical robots.
[Walter 50, 51, 53]
12
describes robots built on cyber-
netic principles which demonstrated goal-seeking behav-
ior, homeostasis, and learning abilities.
The complexity and abilities of Walter's physically
embodied machines rank with the purely imaginary ones
in the rst half dozen chapters of [Braitenberg 84]
three decades later.
The limiting factors in these experiments were
twofold; (1) the technology of building small self con-
tained robots when the computational elements were
miniature (a relative term) vacuum tubes, and (2) the
lack of mechanisms for abstractly describing behavior at
a level below the complete behavior, so that an imple-
mentation could reect those simpler components. Thus
in the rst instance the models of thought were limited
by technological barriers to implementing those models,
and in the second instance, the lack of certain critical
components of a model (organization into submodules)
restricted the ability to build better technological imple-
mentations.
Let us return toWiener and analyze the ways in which
the mechanisms of cybernetics, and the mechanisms of
computationwere intimately interrelated in deep and self
limiting ways.
Wiener was certainly aware of digital machines
13
even
in his earlier edition of [Wiener 48]. He compared them
to analog machines such as the Bush dierential ana-
lyzer, and declares that the digital (or numerical, as he
called them) machines are superior for accurate numeri-
cal calculations. But in some deep sense Wiener did not
see the exibility of these machines. In an added chapter
in [Wiener 61] he discussed the problem of building a
self reproducing machine, and in the Cybernetic tradi-
tion, reduced the problem to modeling the input/output
characteristics of a black box, in particular a non-linear
transducer. He related methods for approximating ob-
servations of this function with a linear combination of
basis non-linear transducers, and then showed that the
whole problem could be done by summing and multi-
plying potentials and averaging over time. Rather than
turn to a digital computer to do this he stated that there
were some interesting possibilities for multiplication de-
vices using piezo-electric eects. We see then the in-
timate tying together between models of computation,
12
Much of the book [Walter 53] is concerned with early
work on electroencephalography and hopes for its role in re-
vealing the workings of the brain|forty years later these
hopes do not seem to have been born out.
13
In the introduction to [Wiener 48] he talks about em-
bodying such machines with photoelectric cells, thermome-
ters, strain gauges and motors in the service of mechanical
labor. But, in the text of the book he does not make such a
connection with models of organisms. Rather he notes that
they are intended for many successive runs, with the memory
being cleared out between runs and states that \the brain,
under normal circumstances, is not the complete analogue of
the computing machine but rather the analogue of a single
run on such a machine". His models of digital computation
and models of thought are too dis-similar to make the con-
nection that we would today.
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i.e., analog computation, and models of the essentials of
self-reproduction. It is impossible to tease apart cause
and eect from this vantage point. The critical point is
the way in which the mathematical proposal is tied to
a technological implementation as a certication of the
validity of the approach
14
.
By the mid sixties it was clear that the study of in-
telligence, even a study arising from the principles of cy-
bernetics, if it was to succeed needed to be more broad-
based in its levels of abstraction and tools of analysis. A
good example is [Arbib 64]
15
. Even so, he still harbors
hope that cybernetic methods may turn out to give an
understanding of the \overall coordinating and integrat-
ing principles" which interrelate the component subsys-
tems of the human nervous system.
3.4 Abstraction
The years immediately following the Dartmouth confer-
ence shaped the eld of Articial Intelligence in a way
which has not signicantly changed. The next few years,
in the main, amplied the abstraction away from situat-
edness, or connectedness to the world
16
. There were a
number of demonstrations along the way which seemed
to legitimize this abstraction. In this section I review
some of those events, and argue that there were funda-
mental aws in the conclusions generally drawn.
At MIT [Roberts 63] demonstrated a vision program
that could match pre-stored models to visual images of
blocks and wedges. This program was the forerunner of
all modern vision programs, and it was many years be-
fore its performance could be matched by others. It took
a grey level image of the world, and extracted a cartoon-
like line drawing. It was this line drawing that was then
tted, via an inverse perspective transform to the pre-
stored models. To those who saw its results this looked
like a straightforward and natural way to process images
and to build models (based on the prestored library) of
the objective reality in front of the camera.
The unfortunate truth however, is that it is extra-
ordinarily dicult to extract reliable line drawings in
any sort of realistic cases of images. In Roberts' case the
lighting was carefully controlled, the blocks were well
painted, and the background was chosen with care. The
images of his blocks produced rather complete line draw-
14
With hindsight, an even wilder speculation is presented
at the end of the later edition. Wiener suggests that the
capital substances of genes and viruses may self reproduce
through such a spectral analysis of infra-red emissions from
the model molecules that then induce self organization into
the undierentiated magma of amino and nucleic acids avail-
able to form the new biological material.
15
Arbib includes an elegant warning against being too com-
mitted to models, even mathematical models, which may turn
out to be wrong. His statement that the \mere use of for-
mulas gives no magical powers to a theory" is just as timely
today as it was then.
16
One exception was a computer controlled hand built at
MIT, [Ernst 61], and connected to the TX-0 computer. The
hand was very much situated and embodied, and relied heav-
ily on the external world as a model, rather than using inter-
nal representations. This piece of work seems to have gotten
lost, for reasons that are not clear to me.
ings with very little clutter where there should, by hu-
man observer standards, be no line elements. Today,
after almost thirty years of research on bottom-up, top-
down, and middle-out line nders, there is still no line
nder that gets such clean results on a single natural
image. Real world images are not at all the clean things
that our personal introspection tells us they are. It is
hard to appreciate this without working on an image
yourself
17
.
The fallout of Roberts' program working on a very
controlled set of images was that people thought that
the line detection problem was doable and solved. E.g.,
[Evans 68] cites Roberts in his discussion of how input
could obtained for his analogy program which compared
sets of line drawings of 2-D geometric gures.
During the late sixties and early seventies the Shakey
project [Nilsson 84] at SRI rearmed the premises of
abstract Articial Intelligence. Shakey, mentioned in
section 2, was a mobile robot that inhabited a set of
specially prepared rooms. It navigated from room to
room, trying to satisfy a goal given to it on a teletype.
It would, depending on the goal and circumstances, nav-
igate around obstacles consisting of large painted blocks
and wedges, push them out of the way, or push them to
some desired location.
Shakey had an onboard black and white television
camera as its primary sensor. An oboard computer an-
alyzed the images, and merged descriptions of what was
seen into an existing rst order predicate calculus model
of the world. A planning program, STRIPS, operated
on those symbolic descriptions of the world to generate
a sequence of actions for Shakey. These plans were trans-
lated through a series of renements into calls to atomic
actions in fairly tight feedback loops with atomic sensing
operations using Shakey's other sensors such as a bump
bar and odometry.
Shakey was considered a great success at the time,
demonstrating an integrated system involving mobility,
perception, representation, planning, execution, and er-
ror recovery.
Shakey's success thus rearmed the idea of relying
completely on internal models of an external objective
reality. That is precisely the methodology it followed,
and it appeared successful. However, it only worked
because of very careful engineering of the environment.
Twenty years later, no mobile robot has been demon-
strated matching all aspects of Shakey's performance in
a more general environment, such as an oce environ-
ment.
The rooms in which Shakey operated were bare except
for the large colored blocks and wedges. This made the
class of objects that had to be represented very simple.
The walls were of a uniform color, and carefully lighted,
with dark rubber baseboards, making clear boundaries
with the lighter colored oor. This meant that very sim-
ple and robust vision of trihedral corners between two
walls and the oor, could be used for relocalizing the
robot in order to correct for drift in the robot's odomet-
ric measurements. The blocks and wedges were painted
dierent colors on dierent planar surfaces. This ensured
17
Try it! You'll be amazed at how bad it is.
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that it was relatively easy, especially in the good lighting
provided, to nd edges in the images separating the sur-
faces, and thus making it easy to identify the shape of
the polyhedron. Blocks and wedges were relatively rare
in the environment, eliminating problems due to partial
obscurations. The objective reality of the environment
was thus quite simple, and the mapping to an internal
model of that reality was also quite plausible.
Around the same time at MIT a major demonstration
was mounted of a robot which could view a scene con-
sisting of stacked blocks, then build a copy of the scene
using a robot arm (see [Winston 72]|the program was
known as the copy-demo). The programs to do this were
very specic to the blocks world, and would not have
worked in the presence of simple curved objects, rough
texture on the blocks, or without carefully controlled
lighting. Nevertheless it reinforced the idea that a com-
plete three dimensional description of the world could be
extracted from a visual image. It legitimized the work of
others, such as [Winograd 72], whose programs worked
in a make-believe world of blocks|if one program could
be built which understood such a world completely and
could also manipulate that world, then it was assumed
that programs which assumed that abstraction could in
fact be connected to the real world without great di-
culty. The problem remained of slowness of the programs
due to the large search spaces, but as before, faster com-
puters were always just around the corner.
The key problem that I see with all this work (apart
from the use of search) is that it relied on the assumption
that a complete world model could be built internally
and then manipulated. The examples from Roberts,
through Shakey and the copy-demo all relied on very
simple worlds, and controlled situations. The programs
were able to largely ignore unpleasant issues like sensor
uncertainty, and were never really stressed because of
the carefully controlled perceptual conditions. No com-
puter vision systems can produce world models of this
delity for anything nearing the complexity of realistic
world scenes|even object recognition is an active and
dicult research area. There are two responses to this:
(1) eventually computer vision will catch up and pro-
vide such world models|I don't believe this based on
the biological evidence presented below, or (2) complete
objective models of reality are unrealistic|and hence
the methods of Articial Intelligence that rely on such
models are unrealistic.
With the rise in abstraction it is interesting to note
that it was still quite technologically dicult to con-
nect to the real world for most Articial Intelligence
researchers
18
. For instance, [Barrow and Salter 70]
describe eorts at Edinburgh, a major Articial Intelli-
gence center, to connect sensing to action, and the results
are extraordinarily primitive by today's standards|both
MIT and SRI had major engineering eorts in support
18
It is still fairly dicult even today. There are very few
turnkey systems available for purchase which connect sen-
sors to reasonable computers, and reasonable computers to
actuators. The situation does seem to be rapidly improving
however|we may well be just about to step over a signicant
threshold.
of their successful activities. [Moravec 81] relates a sad
tale of frustration from the early seventies of eorts at
the Stanford Articial Intelligence Laboratory to build
a simple mobile robot with visual input.
Around the late sixties and early seventies there was
a dramatic increase in the availability of computer pro-
cessing power available to researchers at reasonably well
equipped laboratories. Not only was there a large in-
crease in processing speed and physical memory, but
time sharing systems became well established. An in-
dividual researcher was now able to work continuously
and conveniently on a disembodied program designed to
exhibit intelligence. However, connections to the real
world were not only dicult and overly expensive, but
the physical constraints of using them made develop-
ment of the `intelligent' parts of the system slower by at
least an order of magnitude, and probably two orders, as
compared to the new found power of timesharing. The
computers clearly had a potential to inuence the mod-
els of thought used|and certainly that hypothesis is not
contradicted by the sort of micro-world work that actu-
ally went on.
3.5 Knowledge
By this point in the history of Articial Intelligence,
the trends, assumptions, and approaches had become
well established. The last fteen years have seen the
discipline thundering along on inertia more than any-
thing else. Apart from a renewed irtation with neural
models (see section 3.8 below) there has been very little
change in the underlying assumptions about the mod-
els of thought. This coincides with an era of very little
technical innovation in our underlying models of compu-
tation.
For the remainder of section 3, I rather briey review
the progress made over the last fteen years, and show
how it relates to the fundamental issues of situatedness
and embodiment brought up earlier.
One problem with micro-worlds is that they are some-
what uninteresting. The blocks world was the most pop-
ular micro-world and there is very little that can be done
in it other than make stacks of blocks. After a urry of
early work where particularly dicult `problems' or `puz-
zles' were discovered and then solved (e.g., [Sussman
75]) it became more and more dicult to do something
new within that domain.
There were three classes of responses to this impover-
ished problem space:
 Move to other domains with equally simple seman-
tics, but with more interesting print names than
block-a etc. It was usually not the intent of the re-
searchers to do this, but many in fact did fall into
this trap. [Winograd and Flores 86] expose and
criticize a number of such dressings up in the chap-
ter on \Understanding Language".
 Build a more complex semantics into the blocks
world and work on the new problems which arise.
A rather heroic example of this is [Fahlman 74]
who included balance, multi-shaped blocks, fric-
tion, and the like. The problem with this approach
9
is that the solutions to the `puzzles' become so do-
main specic that it is hard to see how they might
generalize to other domains.
 Move to the wider world. In particular, repre-
sent knowledge about the everyday world, and then
build problem solvers, learning systems, etc., that
operate in this semantically richer world.
The last of these approaches has spawned possibly
the largest recognizable subeld of Articial Intelligence,
known as Knowledge Representation. It has its own con-
ferences. It has theoretical and practical camps. Yet, it
is totally ungrounded. It concentrates much of its ener-
gies on anomalies within formal systems which are never
used for any practical tasks.
[Brachman and Levesque 85] is a collection of pa-
pers in the area. The knowledge representation systems
described receive their input either in symbolic form or
as the output of natural language systems. The goal of
the papers seems to be to represent `knowledge' about
the world. However it is totally ungrounded. There is
very little attempt to use the knowledge (save in the
naive physics [Hayes 85], or qualitative physics [de
Kleer and Brown 84] areas|but note that these areas
too are ungrounded). There is an implicit assumption
that someday the inputs and outputs will be connected
to something which will make use of them (see [Brooks
91a] for an earlier criticism of this approach).
In the meantime the work proceeds with very little to
steer it, and much of it concerns problems produced by
rather simple-minded attempts at representing complex
concepts. To take but one example, there have been
many pages written on the problem of penguins being
birds, even though they cannot y. The reason that this
is a problem is that the knowledge representation sys-
tems are built on top of a computational technology that
makes convenient the use of very simple individuals (Lisp
atoms) and placing links between them. As pointed out
in [Brooks 90b], and much earlier in [Brooks 91a],
such a simple approach does not work when the system
is to be physically grounded through embodiment. It
seems pointless to try to patch up a system which in the
long run cannot possibly work. [Dreyfus 81]
19
provides
a useful criticism of this style of work.
Perhaps the pinnacle of the knowledge-is-everything
approach can be found in [Lenat and Feigenbaum 91]
where they discuss the foundations of a 10-year project
to encode knowledge having the scope of a simple en-
cyclopedia. It is a totally unsituated, and totally dis-
embodied approach. Everything the system is to know
is through hand-entered units of `knowledge', although
there is some hope expressed that later it will be able to
learn itself by reading. [Smith 91] provides a commen-
tary on this approach, and points out how the early years
of the project have been devoted to nding a more prim-
itive level of knowledge than was previously envisioned
for grounding the higher levels of knowledge. It is my
opinion, and also Smith's, that there is a fundamental
19
Endorsement of some of Dreyfus' views should not be
taken as whole hearted embrace of all his arguments.
problem still and one can expect continued regress until
the system has some form of embodiment.
3.6 Robotics
Section 2 outlined the early history of mobile robots.
There have been some interesting developments over
the last ten years as attempts have been made to em-
body some theories from Articial Intelligence in mobile
robots. In this section I briey review some of the re-
sults.
In the early eighties the Defense Advanced Research
Projects Agency (DARPA) in the US, sponsored a ma-
jor thrust in building an Autonomous Land Vehicle. The
initial task for the vehicle was to run along a paved road
in daylight using vision as the primary perceptual sense.
The rst attempts at this problem (e.g., [Waxman,
Le Moigne and Srinivasan 85]) followed the SMPA
methodology. The idea was to build a three-dimensional
world model of the road ahead, then plan a path along
it, including steering and velocity control annotations.
These approaches failed as it was not possible to recover
accurate three-dimensional road models from the visual
images. Even under fairly strong assumptions about the
class of roads being followed the programs would produce
ludicrously wrong results.
With the pressure of getting actual demonstrations
of the vehicle running on roads, and of having all the
processing onboard, radical changes had to made in the
approaches taken. Two separate teams came up with
similar approaches, [Turk, Morgenthaler, Grem-
ban, and Marra 88] at Martin Marietta, the inte-
grating contractor, and [Thorpe, Hebert, Kanade,
and Shafer 88] at CMU, the main academic partici-
pant in the project, both producing vision-based navi-
gation systems. Both systems operated in picture co-
ordinates rather than world coordinates, and both suc-
cessfully drove vehicles along the roads. Neither system
generated three dimensional world models. Rather, both
identied road regions in the images and servo-ed the ve-
hicle to stay on the road. The systems can be character-
ized as reactive, situated and embodied. [Horswill and
Brooks 88] describe a system of similar vintage which
operates an indoor mobile robot under visual navigation.
The shift in approach taken on the outdoor vehicle was
necessitated by the realities of the technology available,
and the need to get things operational.
Despite these lessons there is still a strong bias to fol-
lowing the traditional Articial Intelligence SMPA ap-
proach as can be seen in the work at CMU on the Am-
bler project. The same team that adopted a reactive
approach to the road following problem have reverted to
a cumbersome, complex, and slow complete world mod-
eling approach [Simmons and Krotkov 91].
3.7 Vision
Inspired by the work of [Roberts 63] and that on
Shakey [Nilsson 84], the vision community has been
content to work on scene description problems for many
years. The implicit intent has been that when the rea-
soning systems of Articial Intelligence were ready, the
vision systems would be ready to deliver world models
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as required, and the two could be hooked together to get
a situated, or embodied system.
There are numerous problems with this approach, and
too little room to treat them adequately within the space
constraints of this paper. The fundamental issue is that
Articial Intelligence and Computer Vision have made
an assumption that the purpose of vision is to recon-
struct the static external world (for dynamic worlds it is
just supposed to do it often and quickly) as a three di-
mensional world model. I do not believe that this is pos-
sible with the generality that is usually assumed. Fur-
thermore I do not think it is necessary, nor do I think
that it is what human vision does. Section 4 discusses
some of these issues a little more.
3.8 Parallelism
Parallel computers are potentially quite dierent from
Von Neumann machines. One might expect then that
parallel models of computation would lead to fundamen-
tally dierent models of thought. The story about par-
allelism, and the inuence of parallel machines on mod-
els of thought, and the inuence of models of thought
on parallel machines has two and a half pieces. The
rst piece arose around the time of the early cybernetics
work, the second piece exploded in the mid-eighties and
we have still to see all the casualties. The last half piece
has been pressured by the current models of thought to
change the model of parallelism.
There was a large urry of work in the late fties
and sixties involving linear threshold devices, commonly
known as perceptrons. The extremes in this work are
represented by [Rosenblatt 62] and [Minsky and Pa-
pert 69]. These devices were used in rough analogy to
neurons and were to be wired into networks that learned
to do some task, rather than having to be programmed.
Adjusting the weights on the inputs of these devices
was roughly equivalent in the model to adjusting the
synaptic weights where axons connect to dendrites in
real neurons|this is currently considered as the likely
site of most learning within the brain.
The idea was that the network had specially distin-
guished inputs and outputs. Members of classes of pat-
terns would be presented to the inputs and the outputs
would be given a correct classication. The dierence
between the correct response and the actual response of
the network would then be used to update weights on
the inputs of individual devices. The key driving force
behind the blossoming of this eld was the perceptron
convergence theorem that showed that a simple param-
eter adjustment technique would always let a single per-
ceptron learn a discrimination if there existed a set of
weights capable of making that discrimination.
To make things more manageable the networks were
often structured as layers of devices with connections
only between adjacent layers. The directions of the con-
nections were strictly controlled, so that there were no
feedback loops in the network and that there was a natu-
ral progression from one single layer that would then be
the input layer, and one layer would be the output layer.
The problem with multi-layer networks was that there
was no obvious way to assign the credit or blame over
the layers for a correct or incorrect pattern classication.
In the formal analyses that were carried out (e.g.,
[Nilsson 65] and [Minsky and Papert 69]) only a
single layer of devices which could learn, or be adjusted,
were ever considered. [Nilsson 65] in the later chapters
did consider multi-layer machines, but in each case, all
but one layer consisted of static unmodiable devices.
There was very little work on analyzing machines with
feedback.
None of these machines was particularly situated, or
embodied. They were usually tested on problems set up
by the researcher. There were many abuses of the scien-
tic method in these tests|the results were not always
as the researchers interpreted them.
After the publication of [Minsky and Papert 69],
which contained many negative results on the capabili-
ties of single layer machines, the eld seemed to die out
for about fteen years.
Recently there has been a resurgence in the eld start-
ing with the publication of [Rumelhart and McClel-
land 86].
The new approaches were inspired by a new learn-
ing algorithm known as back propagation ([Rumelhart,
Hinton and Williams 86]). This algorithm gives a
method for assigning credit and blame in fully connected
multi-layer machines without feedback loops. The indi-
vidual devices within the layers have linearly weighted
inputs and a dierentiable output function, a sigmoid,
which closely matches a step function, or threshold func-
tion. Thus they are only slight generalizations of the ear-
lier perceptrons, but their continuous and dierentiable
outputs enable hill climbing to be performed which lets
the networks converge eventually to be able to classify
inputs appropriately as trained.
Back propagation has a number of problems; it is slow
to learn in general, and there is a learning rate which
needs to be tuned by hand in most cases. The eect of
a low learning rate is that the network might often get
stuck in local minima. The eect of a higher learning
rate is that the network may never really converge as
it will be able to jump out of the correct minimum as
well as it can jump out of an incorrect minimum. These
problems combine to make back propagation, which is
the cornerstone of modern neural network research, in-
convenient for use in embodied or situated systems.
In fact, most of the examples in the new wave of neural
networks have not been situated or embodied. There are
a few counterexamples (e.g., [Sejnowksi and Rosen-
berg 87], [Atkeson 89] and [Viola 90]) but in the
main they are not based on back propagation. The most
successful recent learning techniques for situated, em-
bodied, mobile robots, have not been based on parallel
algorithms at all|rather they use a reinforcement learn-
ing algorithm such as Q-learning ([Watkins 89]) as for
example, [Kaelbling 90] and [Mahadevan and Con-
nell 90].
One problem for neural networks becoming situated
or embodied is that they do not have a simple translation
into time varying perception or action pattern systems.
They need extensive front and back ends to equip them
to interact with the world|all the cited examples above
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had such features added to them.
Both waves of neural network research have been her-
alded by predictions of the demise of all other forms of
computation. It has not happened in either case. Both
times there has been a bandwagon eect where many
people have tried to use the mechanisms that have be-
come available to solve many classes of problems, often
without regard to whether the problems could even be
solved in principle by the methods used. In both cases
the enthusiasm for the approach has been largely stimu-
lated by a single piece of technology, rst the perceptron
training rule, and then the back propagation algorithm.
And now for the last half-piece of the parallel compu-
tation story. The primary hope for parallel computation
helping Articial Intelligence has been the Connection
Machine developed by [Hillis 85]. This is a SIMD ma-
chine, and as such might be thought to have limited ap-
plicability for general intelligent activities. Hillis, how-
ever, made a convincing case that it could be used for
many algorithms having to do with knowledge represen-
tation, and that it would speed them up, often to be
constant time algorithms. The book describing the ap-
proach is exciting, and in fact on pages 4 and 5 of [Hillis
85] the author promises to break the Von Neumann bot-
tleneck by making all the silicon in a machine actively
compute all the time. The argument is presented that
most of the silicon in a Von Neumann machine is de-
voted to memory, and most of that is inactive most of
the time. This was a brave new approach, but it has not
survived the market place. New models of the connec-
tion machine have large local memories (in the order of
64K bits) associated with each one bit processor (there
can be up to 64K processors in a single Connection Ma-
chine). Once again, most of the silicon is inactive most
of the time. Connection machines are used within Arti-
cial Intelligence laboratories mostly for computer vision
where there is an obvious mapping from processors and
their NEWS network to pixels of standard digital images.
Traditional Articial Intelligence approaches are so tied
to their traditional machine architectures that they have
been hard to map to this new sort of architecture.
4 Biology
We have our own introspection to tell us how our minds
work, and our own observations to tell us how the be-
havior of other people and of animals works. We have
our own partial theories and methods of explanation
20
.
Sometimes, when an observation, internal or external,
does not t our pre-conceptions, we are rather ready to
dismiss it as something we do not understand, and do
not need to understand.
In this section I will skim over a scattering of recent
work from ethology, psychology, and neuroscience, in an
eort to indicate how decient our everyday understand-
ing of behavior really is. This is important to realize
because traditional Articial Intelligence has relied at
the very least implicitly, and sometimes quite explicitly,
on these folk understandings of human and animal be-
havior. The most common example is the story about
20
See [Churchland 86] for a discussion of folk psychology.
getting from Boston to California (or vice-versa), which
sets up an analogy between what a person does mentally
in order to Plan the trip, and the means-ends method of
planning. See [Agre 91] for a more detailed analysis of
the phenomenon.
4.1 Ethology
Ethology, the study of animal behavior, tries to explain
the causation, development, survival value, and evolu-
tion of behavior patterns within animals. See [McFar-
land 85] for an easy introduction to modern ethology.
Perhaps the most famous ethologist was Niko Tin-
bergen (closely followed by his co-Nobel winners Konrad
Lorenz and Karl von Frisch). His heirarchical view of in-
telligence, described in [Tinbergen 51], is often quoted
by Articial Intelligence researchers in support of their
own hierarchical theories. However, this approach was
meant to be a neurobiologically plausible theory, but it
was described in the absence any evidence. Tinbergen's
model has largely been replaced in modern ethology by
theories of motivational competition, disinhibition, and
dominant and sub-dominant behaviors.
There is no completely worked out theory of exactly
how the decision is made as to which behavioral pattern
(e.g., drinking or eating) should be active in an animal.
A large number of experiments give evidence of complex
internal and external feedback loops in determining an
appropriate behavior. [McFarland 88] presents a num-
ber of such experiments and demonstrates the challenges
for the theories. The experimental data has ruled out
the earlier hierarchical models of behavior selection, and
current theories share many common properties with the
behavior-based approach advocated in this paper.
4.2 Psychology
The way in which our brains work is quite hidden from
us. We have some introspection, we believe, to some as-
pects of our thought processes, but there are certainly
perceptual and motor areas that we are quite condent
we have no access to
21
. To tease out the mechanisms
at work we can do at least two sorts of experiments: we
can test the brain at limits of its operational envelop
to see how it breaks down, and we can study damaged
brains and get a glimpse at the operation of previously
integrated components. In fact, some of these observa-
tions call into question the reliability of any of our own
introspections.
There have been many psychophysical experiments to
test the limits of human visual perception. We are all
aware of so-called optical illusions where our visual ap-
paratus seems to break down. The journal Perception
regularly carries papers which show that what we per-
ceive is not what we see (e.g., [Ramachandran and
Anstis 85]). For instance in visual images of a jump-
ing leopard whose spots are made to articially move
about, we perceive them all as individually following the
21
This contrasts with a popular fad in Articial Intelligence
where all reasoning of a system is supposed to be available
to a meta-reasoning system, or even introspectively to the
system itself.
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leopard. The straightforward model of human percep-
tion proposed by [Marr 82], and almost universally ac-
cepted by Articial Intelligence vision researchers, does
not account for such results. Likewise it is now clear
that the color pathway is separate from the intensity
pathway in the human visual system, and our color vi-
sion is something of an illusion
22
. We are unaware of
these deciencies|most people are not aware that they
have a blind spot in each eye the size of the image of the
moon|they are totally inaccessible to our consciousness.
Even more surprising, our very notion of consciousness is
full of inconsistencies|psychophysical experiments show
that our experience of the ow of time as we observe
things in the world is an illusion, as we can often con-
sciously perceive things in a temporal order inconsistent
with the world as constructed by an experimenter (see
[Dennett and Kinsbourne 90] for an overview).
We turn now to damaged brains to get a glimpse at
how things might be organized. This work can better
be termed neuropsychology. There is a large body of
literature on this subject from which we merely pick out
just a few instances here. The purpose is to highlight the
fact that the approaches taken in traditional Articial
Intelligence are vastly dierent from the way the human
brain is organized.
The common view in Articial Intelligence, and par-
ticularly in the knowledge representation community, is
that there is a central storage system which links to-
gether the information about concepts, individuals, cate-
gories, goals, intentions, desires, and whatever else might
be needed by the system. In particular there is a ten-
dency to believe that the knowledge is stored in a way
that is independent from the way or circumstances in
which it was acquired.
[McCarthy and Warrington 88] (and a series of
earlier papers by them and their colleagues) give cause to
doubt this seemingly logical organization. They report
on a particular individual (identied as TOB), who at
an advanced age developed a semantic decit in knowl-
edge of living things, but retained a reasonable knowl-
edge of inanimate things. By itself, this sounds perfectly
plausible|the semantic knowledge might just be stored
in a category specic way, and the animate part of the
storage has been damaged. But, it happens that TOB
is able to access the knowledge when, for example he
was shown a picture of a dolphin|he was able to form
sentences using the word `dolphin' and talk about its
habitat, its ability to be trained, and its role in the US
military. When verbally asked what a dolphin is, how-
ever, he thought it was either a sh or a bird. He has no
such conict in knowledge when the subject is a wheel-
barrow, say. The authors argue that since the decit
is not complete but shows degradation, the hypothesis
that there is a decit in a particular type of sensory
modality access to a particular category subclass in a
single database is not valid. Through a series of further
observations they argue that they have shown evidence
of modality-specic organization of meaning, besides a
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See the techniques used in the current trend of `coloriza-
tion' of black and white movie classics for a commercial cap-
italization on our visual deciencies.
category specic organization. Thus knowledge may be
duplicated in many places, and may by no means be
uniformly accessible. There are examples of where the
knowledge is shown to be inconsistent. Our normal in-
trospection does not reveal this organization, and would
seem to be at odds with these explanations. Below, we
call into question our normal introspection.
[Newcombe and Ratcli 89] present a long discus-
sion of visuospatial disorders in brain damaged patients.
Many of these severely tax the model of a person as
an integrated rational agent. One simple example they
report is nger agnosia, where a patient may be quite
impaired in the way he can carry out conscious simple
tasks using their ngers, but could still do things such as
thread a needle, or play the piano well. This suggests the
existence of multiple parallel channels of control, rather
than some centralized nger control box, for instance.
[Teitelbaum, Pellis and Pellis 90] summarize
work which shows that rat locomotion involves a number
of reexes. Drugs can be used to shut o many reexes
so that a rat will appear to be unable to move. Almost
all stimuli have no eect|the rat simply remains with its
limbs in whatever conguration the experimenter has ar-
ranged them. However certain very specic stimuli can
trigger a whole chain of complex motor interactions|
e.g., tilting the surface on which the rats feet are resting
to the point where the rat starts to slide will cause the
rat to leap. There has also been a recent popularization
of the work of [Sacks 74] which shows similar symp-
toms, in somewhat less understood detail, for humans.
Again, it is hard to explain these results in terms of a cen-
tralized will|rather an interpretation of multiple almost
independent agencies such as hypothesized by [Minsky
86] seems a better explanation.
Perhaps the most remarkable sets of results are from
split brain patients. It has become common knowledge
that we all possess a left brain and a right brain, but
in patients whose corpus callosum has been severed they
really do become separate operational brains in their own
rights [Gazzaniga and LeDoux 77].
Through careful experimentation it is possible to in-
dependently communicate with the two brains, visually
with both, and verbally with the left. By setting up ex-
periments where one side does not have access to the
information possessed by the other side, it is possible
to push hard on the introspection mechanisms. It turns
out that the ignorant half prefers to fabricate explana-
tions for what is going on, rather than admit ignorance.
These are normal people (except their brains are cut in
half), and it seems that they sincerely believe the lies
they are telling, as a result of confabulations generated
during introspection. One must question then the or-
dinary introspection that goes on when our brains are
intact.
What is the point of all this? The traditional Arti-
cial Intelligence model of representation and organiza-
tion along centralized lines is not how people are built.
Traditional Articial Intelligence methods are certainly
not necessary for intelligence then, and so far they have
not really been demonstrated to be sucient in situ-
ated, embodied systems. The organization of humans is
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by denition sucient|it is not known at all whether
it will turn out to be necessary. The point is that we
cannot make assumptions of necessity under either ap-
proach. The best we can expect to do for a while at
least, is to show that some approach is sucient to pro-
duce interesting intelligence.
4.3 Neuroscience
The working understanding of the brain amongArticial
Intelligence researchers seems to be that it is an electri-
cal machine with electrical inputs and outputs to the
sensors and actuators of the body. One can see this as-
sumption made explicit, for example, in the ction and
speculative writing of professional Articial Intelligence
researchers such as [Dennett 81] and [Moravec 88].
This view, and further reduction, leads to the very sim-
ple models of brain used in connectionism ([Rumelhart
and McClelland 86]).
In fact, however, the brain is embodied with a much
more serious coupling. The brain is situated in a soup
of hormones, that inuences it in the strongest possi-
ble ways. It receives messages encoded hormonally, and
sends messages so encoded throughout the body. Our
electrocentrism, based on our electronic models of com-
putation, has lead us to ignore these aspects in our
informal models of neuroscience, but hormones play a
strong, almost dominating, role in determination of be-
havior in both simple ([Kravitz 88]) and higher animals
([Bloom 76])
23
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Real biological systems are not rational agents that
take inputs, compute logically, and produce outputs.
They are a mess of many mechanisms working in var-
ious ways, out of which emerges the behavior that we
observe and rationalize. We can see this in more detail
by looking both at the individual computational level,
and at the organizational level of the brain.
We do not really know how computation is done at the
lowest levels in the brain. There is debate over whether
the neuron is the functional unit of the nervous system,
or whether a single neuron can act as a many indepen-
dent smaller units ([Cohen and Wu 90]). However,
we do know that signals are propagated along axons
and dendrites at very low speeds compared to electronic
computers, and that there are signicant delays cross-
ing synapses. The usual estimates for the computational
speed of neuronal systems are no more than about 1 Kilo-
Hertz. This implies that the computations that go on in
humans to eect actions in the subsecond range must go
through only a very limited number of processing steps|
the network cannot be very deep in order to get mean-
ingful results out on the timescales that routinely occur
for much of human thought. On the other hand, the net-
works seem incredibly richly connected, compared to the
connection width of either our electronic systems, or our
connectionist models. For simple creatures some motor
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See [Bergland 85] for a history of theories of the brain,
and how they were inuenced by the current technologies
available to provide explanatory power. Unfortunately this
book is marred by the author's own lack of understanding of
computation which leads him to dismiss electrical activity of
the brain as largely irrelevant to the process of thought.
neurons are connected to tens of percent of the other
neurons in the animal. For mammals motor neurons are
typically connected to 5,000 and some neurons in hu-
mans are connected to as many as 90,000 other neurons
([Churchland 86]).
For one very simple animal Caenorhabditis elegans, a
nematode, we have a complete wiring diagram of its ner-
vous system, including its development stages ([Wood
88]). In the hermaphrodite there are 302 neurons and
56 support cells out of the animal's total of 959 cells.
In the male there are 381 neurons and 92 support cells
out of a total of 1031 cells. Even though the anatomy
and behavior of this creature are well studied, and the
neuronal activity is well probed, the way in which the
circuits control the animal's behavior is not understood
very well at all.
Given that even a simple animal is not yet under-
stood one cannot expect to gain complete insight into
building Articial Intelligence by looking at the nervous
systems of complex animals. We can, however, get in-
sight into aspects of intelligent behavior, and some clues
about sensory systems and motor systems.
[Wehner 87] for instance, gives great insight into
the way in which evolution has selected for sensor-
neurological couplings with the environment which can
be very specialized. By choosing the right sensors, ani-
mals can often get by with very little neurological pro-
cessing, in order to extract just the right information
about the here and now around them, for the task at
hand. Complex world model building is not possible
given the sensors' limitations, and not needed when the
creature is appropriately situated.
[Cruse 90] and [Gotz and Wenking 73] give in-
sight into how simple animals work, based on an under-
standing at a primitive level of their neurological circuits.
These sorts of clues can help us as we try to build walking
robots{for examples of such computational neuroethol-
ogy see [Brooks 89] and [Beer 90].
These clues can help us build better articial systems,
but by themselves they do not provide us with a full
theory.
5 Ideas
Earlier we identied situatedness, embodiment, intelli-
gence, and emergence, with a set of key ideas that have
lead to a new style of Articial Intelligence research
which we are calling behavior-based robots. In this sec-
tion I expound on these four topics in more detail.
5.1 Situatedness
Traditional Articial Intelligence has adopted a style of
research where the agents that are built to test theories
in intelligence are essentially problem solvers that work
in an symbolic abstracted domain. The symbols may
have referents in the minds of the builders of the systems,
but there is nothing to ground those referents in any real
world. Furthermore, the agents are not situated in a
world at all. Rather they are given a problem, and they
solve it. Then, they are given another problem and they
solve it. They are not participating in a world as would
agents in the usual sense.
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In these systems there is no external world per se,
with continuity, surprises, or ongoing history. The pro-
grams deal only with a model world, with its own built-
in physics. There is a blurring between the knowledge
of the agent and the world it is supposed to be oper-
ating in|indeed in many Articial Intelligence systems
there is no distinction between the two|the agent has
access to direct and perfect perception, and direct and
perfect action. When consideration is given to porting
such agents or systems to operate in the world, the ques-
tion arises of what sort of representation they need of the
real world. Over the years within traditional Articial
Intelligence, it has become accepted that they will need
an objective model of the world with individuated en-
tities, tracked and identied over time|the models of
knowledge representation that have been developed ex-
pect and require such a one-to-one correspondence be-
tween the world and the agent's representation of it.
The early robots such as Shakey and the Cart cer-
tainly followed this approach. They built models of
the world, planned paths around obstacles, and updated
their estimate of where objects were relative to them-
selves as they moved. We developed a dierent approach
[Brooks 86] where a mobile robot used the world as its
own model|continuously referring to its sensors rather
than to an internal world model. The problems of object
class and identity disappeared. The perceptual process-
ing became much simpler. And the performance of the
robot was better in comparable tasks than that of the
Cart
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, and with much less computation, even allowing
for the dierent sensing modalities.
[Agre 88] and [Chapman 90] formalized these ideas
in their arguments for deictic (or indexical-functional in
an earlier incarnation) representations. Instead of hav-
ing representations of individual entities in the world,
the system has representations in terms of the relation-
ship of the entities to the robot. These relationships are
both spatial and functional. For instance in Pengi [Agre
and Chapman 87], rather than refer to Bee-27 the sys-
tem refers to the-bee-that-is-chasing-me-now. The latter
may or may not be the same bee that was chasing the
robot two minutes previously|it doesn't matter for the
particular tasks in which the robot is engaged.
When this style of representation is used it is possi-
ble to build computational systems which trade o com-
putational depth for computational width. The idea is
that the computation can be represented by a network
of gates, timers, and state elements. The network does
not need long paths from inputs (sensors) to outputs
(actuators). Any computation that is capable of being
done is done in a very short time span. There have been
other approaches which address a similar time-bounded
computation issue, namely the bounded rationality ap-
proach [Russell 89]. Those approaches try to squeeze a
traditional Articial Intelligence system into a bounded
amount of computation. With the new approach we tend
to come from the other direction, we start with very lit-
tle computation and build up the amount, while staying
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The tasks carried out by this rst robot, Allen, were of a
dierent class than those attempted by Shakey. Shakey could
certainly not have carried out the tasks that Allen did.
away from the boundary of computation that takes too
long. As more computation needs to be added there is
a tendency to add it in breadth (thinking of the compu-
tation as being represented by a circuit whose depth is
the longest path length in gates from input to output)
rather than depth.
A situated agent must respond in a timely fashion to
its inputs. Modeling the world completely under these
conditions can be computationally challenging. But a
world in which it is situated also provides some conti-
nuity to the agent. That continuity can be relied upon,
so that the agent can use its perception of the world in-
stead of an objective world model. The representational
primitives that are useful then change quite dramatically
from those in traditional Articial Intelligence.
The key idea from situatedness is:
The world is its own best model.
5.2 Embodiment
There are two reasons that embodiment of intelligent
systems is critical. First, only an embodied intelligent
agent is fully validated as one that can deal with the
real world. Second, only through a physical grounding
can any internal symbolic or other system nd a place to
bottom out, and give `meaning' to the processing going
on within the system.
The physical grounding of a robot in the world forces
its designer to deal with all the issues. If the intelligent
agent has a body, has sensors, and has actuators, then
all the details and issues of being in the world must be
faced. It is no longer possible to argue in conference pa-
pers, that the simulated perceptual system is realistic, or
that problems of uncertainty in action will not be signif-
icant. Instead, physical experiments can be done simply
and repeatedly. There is no room for cheating
25
. When
this is done it is usual to nd that many of the prob-
lems that seemed signicant are not so in the physical
system (typically `puzzle' like situations where symbolic
reasoning seemed necessary tend not to arise in embod-
ied systems), and many that seemed non-problems be-
come major hurdles (typically these concern aspects of
perception and action)
26
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A deeper problem is \can there be disembodied
mind?". Many believe that what is human about us is
very directly related to our physical experiences. For in-
stance [Johnson 87] argues that a large amount of our
language is actually metaphorically related to our phys-
ical connections to the world. Our mental `concepts' are
based on physically experienced exemplars. [Smith 91]
suggests that without physical grounding there can be
no halt to the regress within a knowledge based system
as it tries to reason about real world knowledge such
25
I mean this in the sense of causing self-delusion, not in
the sense of wrong doing with intent.
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In fact, there is some room for cheating as the physical
environment can be specially simplied for the robot|and
in fact it may be very hard in some cases to identify such
self delusions. In some research projects it may be necessary
to test a particular class of robot activities, and therefore it
may be necessary to build a test environment for the robot.
There is a ne and dicult to dene line to be drawn here.
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as that contained in an encyclopedia (e.g., [Lenat and
Feigenbaum 91]).
Without an ongoing participation and perception of
the world there is no meaning for an agent. Everything
is random symbols. Arguments might be made that at
some level of abstraction even the human mind operates
in this solipsist position. However, biological evidence
(see section 4) suggests that the human mind's connec-
tion to the world is so strong, and many faceted, that
these philosophical abstractions may not be correct.
The key idea from embodiment is:
The world grounds regress.
5.3 Intelligence
[Brooks 91a] argues that the sorts of activities we usu-
ally think of as demonstrating intelligence in humans
have been taking place for only a very small fraction
of our evolutionary lineage. Further, I argue that the
`simple' things to do with perception and mobility in a
dynamic environment took evolution much longer to per-
fect, and that all those capabilities are a necessary basis
for `higher-level' intellect.
Therefore, I proposed looking at simpler animals as a
bottom-up model for building intelligence. It is soon ap-
parent, when `reasoning' is stripped away as the prime
component of a robot's intellect, that the dynamics of
the interaction of the robot and its environment are pri-
mary determinants of the structure of its intelligence.
Earlier, [Simon 69] had discussed a similar point in
terms of an ant walking along the beach. He pointed out
that the complexity of the behavior of the ant is more a
reection of the complexity of its environment than its
own internal complexity. He speculated that the same
may be true of humans, but within two pages of text
had reduced studying human behavior to the domain of
crypto-arithmetic problems.
It is hard to draw the line at what is intelligence, and
what is environmental interaction. In a sense it does not
really matter which is which, as all intelligent systems
must be situated in some world or other if they are to
be useful entities.
The key idea from intelligence is:
Intelligence is determined by the dynamics of
interaction with the world.
5.4 Emergence
In discussing where intelligence resides in an Articial
Intelligence program [Minsky 61] points out that \there
is never any `heart' in a program" and \we nd senseless
loops and sequences of trivial operations". It is hard to
point at a single component as the seat of intelligence.
There is no homunculus. Rather, intelligence emerges
from the interaction of the components of the system.
The way in which it emerges, however, is quite dierent
for traditional and behavior-based Articial Intelligence
systems.
In traditional Articial Intelligence the modules that
are dened are information processing, or functional.
Typically these modules might be a perception module,
a planner, a world modeler, a learner, etc. The compo-
nents directly participate in functions such as perceiving,
planning, modeling, learning, etc. Intelligent behavior
of the system, such as avoiding obstacles, standing up,
controlling gaze, etc., emerges from the interaction of the
components.
In behavior-based Articial Intelligence the modules
that are dened are behavior producing. Typically these
modules might be an obstacle avoidance behavior, a
standing up behavior, a gaze control behavior, etc. The
components directly participate in producing behaviors
such as avoiding obstacles, standing up, controlling gaze,
etc. Intelligent functionality of the system, such as per-
ception, planning, modeling, learning, etc., emerges from
the interaction of the components.
Although this dualism between traditional and
behavior-based systems looks pretty it is not completely
accurate. Traditional systems have hardly ever been re-
ally connected to the world, and so the emergence of
intelligent behavior is something more of an expectation
in most cases, rather than an established phenomenon.
Conversely, because of the many behaviors present in a
behavior-based system, and their individual dynamics of
interaction with the world, it is often hard to say that
a particular series of actions was produced by a partic-
ular behavior. Sometimes many behaviors are operating
simultaneously, or are switching rapidly [Horswill and
Brooks 88].
Over the years there has been a lot of work on
emergence based on the theme of self-organization (e.g.,
[Nicolis and Prigogine 77]). Within behavior-based
robots there is beginning to be work at better charac-
terizing emergent functionality, but it is still in its early
stages, e.g., [Steels 90a]. He denes it as meaning that
a function is achieved \indirectly by the interaction of
more primitive components among themselves and with
the world".
It is hard to identify the seat of intelligence within any
system, as intelligence is produced by the interactions of
many components. Intelligence can only be determined
by the total behavior of the system and how that behav-
ior appears in relation to the environment.
The key idea from emergence is:
Intelligence is in the eye of the observer.
6 Thought
Since late 1984 I have been building autonomous mobile
robots in the `Mobot Lab' at the MIT Articial Intelli-
gence Laboratory; [Brooks 86] gives the original ideas,
and [Brooks 90b] contains a recent summary of the ca-
pabilities of the robots developed in my laboratory over
the years.
My work ts within the framework described above
in terms of situatedness, embodiment, intelligence and
emergence. In particular I have advocated situatedness,
embodiment, and highly reactive architectures with no
reasoning systems, no manipulable representations, no
symbols, and totally decentralized computation. This
dierent model of computation has lead to radically dif-
ferent models of thought.
I have been accused of overstating the case that the
new approach is all that is necessary to build truly in-
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telligent systems. It has even been suggested that as an
evangelist I have deliberately overstated my case to pull
people towards the correct level of belief, and that re-
ally all along, I have known that a hybrid approach is
necessary.
That is not what I believe. I think that the new ap-
proach can be extended to cover the whole story, both
with regards to building intelligent systems and to un-
derstanding human intelligence|the two principal goals
identied for Articial Intelligence at the beginning of
the paper.
Whether I am right or not is an empirical question.
Multiple approaches to Articial Intelligence will con-
tinue to be pursued. At some point we will be able to
evaluate which approach has been more successful.
In this section I want to outline the philosophical un-
derpinnings of my work, and discuss why I believe the
approach is the one that will in the end will prove dom-
inant.
6.1 Principles
All research goes on within the constraints of certain
principles. Sometimes these are explicit, and sometimes
they are implicit. In the following paragraphs I outline
as explicitly as I can the principles followed.
The rst set of principles denes the domain for the
work.
 The goal is to study complete integrated intelligent
autonomous agents.
 The agents should be embodied as mobile robots,
situated in unmodied worlds found around our
laboratory
27
. This confronts the embodiment is-
sue. The environments chosen are for conve-
nience, although we strongly resist the temptation
to change the environments in any way for the
robots.
 The robots should operate equally well when vis-
itors, or cleaners, walk through their workspace,
when furniture is rearranged, when lighting or
other environmental conditions change, and when
their sensors and actuators drift in calibration.
This confronts the situatedness issue.
 The robots should operate on timescales commen-
surate with the time scales used by humans. This
too confronts the situatedness issue.
The specic model of computation used was not orig-
inally based on biological models. It was one arrived at
by continuously rening attempts to program a robot to
reactively avoid collisions in a people-populated environ-
ment, [Brooks 86]. Now, however, in stating the prin-
ciples used in the model of computation, it is clear that
it shares certain properties with models of how neuro-
logical systems are arranged. It is important to empha-
size that it only shares certain properties. Our model
27
This constraint has slipped a little recently as we are
working on building prototype small legged planetary rovers
([Angle and Brooks 90]). We have built a special pur-
pose environment for the robots|a physically simulated lu-
nar surface.
of computation is not intended as a realistic model of
how neurological systems work. We call our computa-
tion model the subsumption architecture and its purpose
is to program intelligent, situated, embodied agents.
Our principles of computation are:
 Computation is organized as an asynchronous net-
work of active computational elements (they are
augmented nite state machines|see [Brooks 89]
for details
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), with a xed topology network of uni-
directional connections.
 Messages sent over connections have no implicit
semantics|they are small numbers (typically 8 or
16 bits, but on some robots just 1 bit) and their
meanings are dependent on the dynamics designed
into both the sender and receiver.
 Sensors and actuators are connected to this net-
work, usually through asynchronous two-sided
buers.
These principles lead to certain consequences. In par-
ticular:
 The system can certainly have state|it is not at
all constrained to be purely reactive.
 Pointers and manipulable data structures are very
hard to implement (since the model is Turing
equivalent it is of course possible, but hardly within
the spirit).
 Any search space must be quite bounded in size, as
search nodes cannot be dynamically created and
destroyed during the search process.
 There is no implicit separation of data and com-
putation, they are both distributed over the same
network of elements.
In considering the biological observations outlined in
section 4, certain properties seemed worth incorporating
into the way in which robots are programmed within the
given model of computation. In all the robots built in
the mobot lab, the following principles of organization
of intelligence have been observed:
 There is no central model maintained of the world.
All data is distributed over many computational
elements.
 There is no central locus of control.
 There is no separation into perceptual system, cen-
tral system, and actuation system. Pieces of the
network may perform more than one of these func-
tions. More importantly, there is intimate inter-
twining of aspects of all three of them.
 The behavioral competence of the system is im-
proved by addingmore behavior-specic network to
the existing network. We call this process layering.
This is a simplistic and crude analogy to evolution-
ary development. As with evolution, at every stage
28
For programming convenience we use a higher level ab-
straction known as the Behavior Language, documented in
[Brooks 90c]. It compiles down to a network of machines
as described above.
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of the development the systems are tested|unlike
evolution there is a gentle debugging process avail-
able. Each of the layers is a behavior-producing
piece of network in its own right, although it may
implicitly rely on presence of earlier pieces of net-
work.
 There is no hierarchical arrangement|i.e., there is
no notion of one process calling on another as a sub-
routine. Rather the networks are designed so that
needed computations will simply be available on
the appropriate input line when needed. There is
no explicit synchronization between a producer and
a consumer of messages. Message reception buers
can be overwritten by new messages before the con-
sumer has looked at the old one. It is not atypical
for a message producer to send 10 messages for ev-
ery one that is examined by the receiver.
 The layers, or behaviors, all run in parallel. There
may need to be a conict resolution mechanism
when dierent behaviors try to give dierent ac-
tuator commands.
 The world is often a good communication medium
for processes, or behaviors, within a single robot.
It should be clear that these principles are quite dif-
ferent to the ones we have become accustomed to using
as we program Von Neumann machines. It necessarily
forces the programmer to use a dierent style of organi-
zation for their programs for intelligence.
There are also always inuences on approaches to
building thinking machines that lie outside the realm
of purely logical or scientic thought. The following,
perhaps arbitrary, principles have also had an inuence
on the organization of intelligence that has been used in
Mobot Lab robots:
 A decision was made early on that all computation
should be done onboard the robots. This was so
that the robots could run tether-free and without
any communication link. The idea is to download
programs over cables (although in the case of some
of our earlier robots the technique was to plug in
a newly written erasable ROM) into non-volatile
storage on the robots, then switch them on to in-
teract with and be situated in the environment.
 In order to maintain a long term goal of being able
to eventually produce very tiny robots ([Flynn
87]) the computational model has been restricted
so that any specication within that model could be
rather easily compiled into a silicon circuit. This
has put an additional constraint on designers of
agent software, in that they cannot use non-linear
numbers of connections between collections of com-
putational elements, as that would lead to severe
silicon compilation problems. Note that the gen-
eral model of computation outlined above is such
that a goal of silicon compilation is in general quite
realistic.
The point of section 3 was to show how the technol-
ogy of available computation had a major impact on the
shape of the developing eld of Articial Intelligence.
Likewise there have been a number of inuences on my
own work that are technological in nature. These in-
clude:
 Given the smallness in overall size of the robots
there is a very real limitation on the amount of
onboard computation that can be carried, and by
an earlier principle all computation must be done
onboard. The limiting factor on the amount of
portable computation is not weight of the comput-
ers directly, but the electrical power that is avail-
able to run them. Empirically we have observed
that the amount of electrical power available is pro-
portional to the weight of the robot
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 Since there are many single chip microprocessors
available including EEPROM and RAM, it is be-
coming more possible to include large numbers of
sensors which require interrupt servicing, local cali-
bration, and data massaging. The microprocessors
can signicantly reduce the overall wiring complex-
ity by servicing a local group of sensors (e.g., all
those on a single leg of a robot) in situ, and pack-
aging up the data to run over a communication
network to the behavior-producing network.
These principles have been used in the programming
of a number of behavior-based robots. Below we point
out the importance of some of these robot demonstra-
tions in indicating how the subsumption architecture (or
one like it in spirit) can be expected to scale up to very
intelligent applications. In what follows individual ref-
erences are given to the most relevant piece of the lit-
erature. For a condensed description of what each of
the robots is and how they are programmed, the reader
should see [Brooks 90b]; it also includes a number of
robots not mentioned here.
6.2 Reactivity
The earliest demonstration of the subsumption architec-
ture was on the robot Allen ([Brooks 86]). It was al-
most entirely reactive, using sonar readings to keep away
from people and other moving obstacles, while not col-
liding with static obstacles. It also had a non-reactive
higher level layer that would select a goal to head to-
wards, and then proceed to that location while the lower
level reactive layer took care of avoiding obstacles.
The very rst subsumption robot thus combined non-
reactive capabilities with reactive ones. But the impor-
tant point is that it used exactly the same sorts of com-
putational mechanism to do both. In looking at the
network of the combined layers there was no obvious
partition into lower and higher level components based
on the type of information owing on the connections,
or the state machines that were the computational el-
ements. To be sure, there was a dierence in function
between the two layers, but there was no need to in-
troduce any centralization or explicit representations to
29
Jon Connell, a former member of the Mobot Lab, plotted
data from a large number of mobile robots and noted the em-
pirical fact that there is roughly one watt of electrical power
available for onboard computation for every pound of overall
weight of the robot. We call this Connell's Law.
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achieve a higher level, or later, process having useful and
eective inuence over a lower level.
The second robot, Herbert ([Connell 89]), pushed
on the reactive approach. It used a laser scanner to nd
soda can-like objects visually, infrared proximity sensors
to navigate by following walls and going through door-
ways, a magnetic compass to maintain a global sense of
orientation, and a host of sensors on an arm which were
sucient to reliably pick up soda cans. The task for Her-
bert was to wander around looking for soda cans, pick
one up, and bring it back to where Herbert had started
from. It was demonstrated reliably nding soda cans in
rooms using its laser range nder (some tens of trials),
picking up soda cans many times (over 100 instances), re-
liably navigating (many hours of runs), and in one nale
doing all the tasks together to navigate, locate, pickup
and return with a soda can
30
.
In programming Herbert it was decided that it should
maintain no state longer than three seconds, and that
there would be no internal communication between be-
havior generating modules. Each one was connected to
sensors on the input side, and a xed priority arbitration
network on the output side. The arbitration network
drove the actuators.
In order to carry out its tasks, Herbert, in many in-
stances, had to use the world as its own best model and
as a communication medium. E.g., the laser-based soda
can object nder drove the robot so that its arm was
lined up in front of the soda can. But it did not tell
the arm controller that there was now a soda can ready
to be picked up. Rather, the arm behaviors monitored
the shaft encoders on the wheels, and when they noticed
that there was no body motion, initiated motions of the
arm, which in turn triggered other behaviors, so that
eventually the robot would pick up the soda can.
The advantage of this approach is was that there was
no need to set up internal expectations for what was go-
ing to happen next; that meant that the control system
could both (1) be naturally opportunistic if fortuitous
circumstances presented themselves, and (2) it could eas-
ily respond to changed circumstances, such as some other
object approaching it on a collision course.
As one example of how the arm behaviors cascaded
upon one another, consider actually grasping a soda can.
The hand had a grasp reex that operated whenever
something broke an infrared beam between the ngers.
When the arm located a soda can with its local sensors,
it simply drove the hand so that the two ngers lined up
on either side of the can. The hand then independently
grasped the can. Given this arrangement, it was possible
for a human to hand a soda can to the robot. As soon
as it was grasped, the arm retracted|it did not matter
whether it was a soda can that was intentionally grasped,
or one that magically appeared. The same opportunism
among behaviors let the arm adapt automatically to a
wide variety of cluttered desktops, and still successfully
nd the soda can.
In order to return to where it came from after picking
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The limiting factor on Herbert was the mechanical seat-
ing of its chips|its mean time between chip seating failure
was no more than 15 minutes.
up a soda can, Herbert used a trick. The navigation rou-
tines could carry implement rules such as: when passing
through a door southbound, turn left. These rules were
conditionalized on the separation of the ngers on the
hand. When the robot was outbound with no can in
its hand, it eectively executed one set of rules. After
picking up a can, it would execute a dierent set. By
carefully designing the rules, Herbert was guaranteed,
with reasonable reliability, to retrace its path.
The point of Herbert is two-fold.
 It demonstrates complex, apparently goal directed
and intentional, behavior in a system which has no
long term internal state and no internal communi-
cation.
 It is very easy for an observer of a system to at-
tribute more complex internal structure than re-
ally exists. Herbert appeared to be doing things
like path planning and map building, even though
it was not.
6.3 Representation
My earlier paper [Brooks 91a] is often criticized for ad-
vocating absolutely no representation of the world within
a behavior-based robot. This criticism is invalid. I make
it clear in the paper that I reject traditional Articial
Intelligence representation schemes (see section 5). I
also made it clear that I reject explicit representations
of goals within the machine.
There can, however, be representations which are par-
tial models of the world|in fact I mentioned that \in-
dividual layers extract only those aspects of the world
which they nd relevant|projections of a representation
into a simple subspace" [Brooks 91a]. The form these
representations take, within the context of the computa-
tional model we are using, will depend on the particular
task those representations are to be used for. For more
general navigation than that demonstrated by Connell
it may sometimes
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need to build and maintain a map.
[Mataric 90, 91] introduced active-constructive rep-
resentations to subsumption in a sonar-based robot,
Toto, which wandered around oce environments build-
ing a map based on landmarks, and then used that map
to get from one location to another. Her representa-
tions were totally decentralized and non-manipulable,
and there is certainly no central control which build,
maintains, or uses the maps. Rather, the map itself is
an active structure which does the computations neces-
sary for any path planning the robot needs to do.
Primitive layers of control let Toto wander around fol-
lowing boundaries (such as walls and furniture clutter)
in an indoor environment. A layer which detects land-
marks, such as at clear walls, corridors, etc., runs in
parallel. It informs the map layer as its detection cer-
tainty exceeds a xed threshold. The map is represented
as a graph internally. The nodes of the graph are compu-
tational elements (they are identical little subnetworks
31
Note that we are saying only sometimes, not must|there
are many navigation tasks doable by mobile robots which
appear intelligent, but which do not require map information
at all.
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of distinct augmented nite state machines). Free nodes
arbitrate and allocate themselves, in a purely local fash-
ion, to represent a new landmark, and set up topological
links to physically neighboring nodes (using a limited ca-
pacity switching network to keep the total virtual `wire
length' between nite state machines to be linear in the
map capacity). These nodes keep track of where the
robot is physically, by observing changes in the output
of the landmark detector, and comparing that to pre-
dictions they have made by local message passing, and
by referring to other more primitive (magnetic compass
based) coarse position estimation schemes.
When a higher layer wants the robot to go to some
known landmark, it merely `excites', in some particular
way the particular place in the map that it wants to
go. The excitation (this is an abstraction programmed
into the particular nite state machines used here|it is
not a primitive|as such there could be many dierent
types of excitation co-existing in the map, if other types
of planning are required) is spread through the map fol-
lowing topological links, estimating total path link, and
arriving at the landmark-that-I'm-at-now node (a deictic
representation) with a recommendation of the direction
to travel right now to follow the shortest path. As the
robot moves so to does its representation of where it
is, and at that new node the arriving excitation tells it
where to go next. The map thus bears a similarity to the
internalized plans of [Payton 90], but it represented by
the same computational elements that use it|there is
no distinction between data and process. Furthermore
Mataric's scheme can have multiple simultaneously ac-
tive goals|the robot will simply head towards the near-
est one.
This work demonstrates the following aspects of
behavior-based or subsumption systems:
 Such systems can make predictions about what will
happen in the world, and have expectations.
 Such systems can make plans|but they are not the
same as traditional Articial Intelligence plans|
see [Agre and Chapman 90] for an analysis of
this issue.
 Such systems can have goals|see [Maes 90b] for
another way to implement goals within the ap-
proach.
 All these things can be done without resorting to
central representations.
 All these things can be done without resorting to
manipulable representations.
 All these things can be done without resorting to
symbolic representations.
6.4 Complexity
Can subsumption-like approaches scale to arbitrarily
complex systems? This is a question that cannot be an-
swered armatively right now|just as it is totally un-
founded to answer the same question armatively in the
case of traditional symbolic Articial Intelligence meth-
ods. The best one can do is point to precedents and
trends.
There are a number of dimensions along which the
scaling question can be asked. E.g.,
 Can the approach work well as the environment
becomes more complex?
 Can the approach handle larger numbers of sensors
and actuators?
 Can the approach work smoothly as more and more
layers or behaviors are added?
We answer each of these in turn in the following para-
graphs.
The approach taken at the Mobot Lab has been that
from day one always test the robot in the most complex
environment for which it is ultimately destined. This
forces even the simplest levels to handle the most com-
plex environment expected. So for a given robot and
intended environment the scaling question is handled by
the methodology chosen for implementation. But there
is also the question of how complex are the environ-
ments that are targeted for with the current generation
of robots. Almost all of our robots have been tested and
operated in indoor environments with people unrelated
to the research wandering through their work area at
will. Thus we have a certain degree of condence that
the same basic approach will work in outdoor environ-
ments (the sensory processing will have to change for
some sensors) with other forms of dynamic action tak-
ing place.
The number of sensors and actuators possessed by
today's robots are pitiful when compared to the num-
bers in even simple organisms such as insects. Our rst
robots had only a handful of identical sonar sensors and
two motors. Later a six legged walking robot was built
[Angle 89]. It had 12 actuators and 20 sensors, and was
successfully programmed in subsumption ([Brooks 89])
to walk adaptively over rough terrain. The key was to
nd the right factoring into sensor and actuator subsys-
tems so that interactions between the subsystems could
be minimized. A new six legged robot, recently com-
pleted ([Brooks and Angle 90], is much more chal-
lenging, but still nowhere near the complexity of insects.
It has 23 actuators and over 150 sensors. With this
level of sensing it is possible to start to develop some
of the `senses' that animals and humans have, such as
a kinesthetic sense|this comes from the contributions
of many sensor readings. Rather, than feed into a geo-
metric model the sensors feed into a estimate of bodily
motion. There is also the question of the types of sen-
sors used. [Horswill and Brooks 88] generalized the
subsumption architecture so that some of the connec-
tions between processing elements could be a retina bus,
a cable that transmitted partially processed images from
one site to another within the system. The robot so pro-
grammed was able to follow corridors and follow moving
objects in real time.
As we add more layers we nd that the interactions
can become more complex. [Maes 89] introduced the
notion of switching whole pieces of the network on and
o, using an activation scheme for behaviors. That idea
is now incorporated into the subsumption methodology
[Brooks 90c], and provides a way of implementing both
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competition and cooperation between behaviors. At a
lower level a hormone-like system has been introduced
([Brooks 91b]) which models the hormone system of
the lobster [Kravitz 88] ([Arkin 88] had implemented
a system with similar inspiration). With these additional
control mechanisms we have certainly bought ourselves
breathing room to increase the performance of our sys-
tems markedly. The key point about these control sys-
tems is that they t exactly into the existing structures,
and are totally distributed and local in their operations.
6.5 Learning
Evolution has decided that there is a tradeo between
what we know through our genes and what we must nd
out for ourselves as we develop. We can expect to see a
similar tradeo for our behavior-based robots.
There are at least four classes of things that can be
learned:
1. representations of the world that help in some task
2. aspects of instances of sensors and actuators (this
is sometimes called calibration)
3. the ways in which individual behaviors should in-
teract
4. new behavioral modules
The robots in the Mobot Lab have been programmed
to demonstrate the rst three of these types of learning.
The last one has not yet been successfully tackled
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Learning representations of the world was already dis-
cussed above concerning the work of [Mataric 90, 91].
The next step will be to generalize active-constructive
representations to more classes of use.
[Viola 90] demonstrated calibration of a complex
head-eye system modeling the primate vestibulo-ocular
system. In this system there is one fast channel between
a gyroscope and a high performance pan-tilt head hold-
ing the camera, and a slower channel using vision which
produces correction signals for the gyroscope channel.
The same system was used to learn how to accurately
saccade to moving stimuli.
Lastly, [Maes and Brooks 90] programmed an early
six legged robot to learn to walk using the subsumption
architecture along with the behavior activation schemes
of [Maes 89]. Independent behaviors on each leg moni-
tored the activity of other behaviors and correlated that,
their own activity state, and the results from a belly
switch which provided negative feedback, as input to a
local learning rule which learned under which conditions
it was to operate the behavior. After about 20 trials per
leg, spread over a total of a minute or two, the robot re-
liably learns the alternating tripod gait|it slowly seems
to emerge out of initially chaotic ailing of the legs.
Learning within subsumption is in its early stages but
it has been demonstrated in a number of dierent critical
modes of development.
32
We did have a failed attempt at this through simulated
evolution|this is the approach taken by many in the Arti-
cial Life movement.
6.6 Vistas
The behavior-based approach has been demonstrated on
situated embodied systems doing things that traditional
Articial Intelligence would have tackled in quite dier-
ent ways. What are the key research areas that need
to be addressed in order to push behavior-based robots
towards more and more sophisticated capabilities?
In this section we outline research challenges in three
categories or levels
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:
 Understanding the dynamics of how an individ-
ual behavior couples with the environment via the
robot's sensors and actuators. The primary con-
cerns here are what forms of perception are neces-
sary, and what relationships exist between percep-
tion, internal state, and action (i.e., how behavior
is specied or described).
 Understanding how many behaviors can be inte-
grated into a single robot. The primary concerns
here are how independent various perceptions and
behaviors can be, how much they must rely on, and
interfere with each other, how a competent com-
plete robot can be built in such a way as to accom-
modate all the required individual behaviors, and
to what extent apparently complex behaviors can
emerge from simple reexes.
 Understanding howmultiple robots (either a homo-
geneous, or a heterogeneous group) can interact as
they go about their business. The primary concerns
here are the relationships between individuals' be-
haviors, the amount and type of communication
between robots, the way the environment reacts to
multiple individuals, and the resulting patterns of
behavior and their impacts upon the environment
(which night not occur in the case of isolated indi-
viduals).
Just as research in Articial Intelligence is broken into
subelds, these categories provide subelds of behavior-
based robots within which it is possible to concentrate a
particular research project. Some of these topics are the-
oretical in nature, contributing to a science of behavior-
based systems. Others are engineering in nature, provid-
ing tools and mechanisms for successfully building and
programming behavior-based robots. Some of these top-
ics have already been touched upon by researchers in
behavior-based approaches, but none of them are yet
solved or completely understood.
At the individual behavior level some of the important
issues are as follows:
Convergence: Demonstrate or prove that a specied
behavior is such that the robot will indeed carry
out the desired task successfully. For instance, we
may want to give some set of initial conditions for
a robot, and some limitations on possible worlds
in which it is placed, and show that under those
conditions, the robot is guaranteed to follow a par-
ticular wall, rather than diverge and get lost.
33
The reader is referred to [Brooks 90a] for a more com-
plete discussion of these issues.
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Synthesis: Given a particular task, automatically de-
rive a behavior specication for the creature so
that it carries out that task in a way which has
clearly demonstrable convergence. I do not expect
progress in this topic in the near future.
Complexity: Deal with the complexity of real world
environments, and sift out the relevant aspects of
received sensations rather than being overwhelmed
with a multitude of data.
Learning: Develop methods for the automatic acqui-
sition of new behaviors, and the modication and
tuning of existing behaviors.
As multiple behaviors are built into a single robot the
following issues need to be addressed:
Coherence: Even though many behaviors may be ac-
tive at once, or are being actively switched on or
o, the robot should still appear to an observer to
have coherence of action and goals. It should not
be rapidly switching between inconsistent behav-
iors, nor should two behaviors be active simultane-
ously, if they interfere with each other to the point
that neither operates successfully.
Relevance: The behaviors that are active should be rel-
evant to the situation the robot nds itself in|e.g.,
it should recharge itself when the batteries are low,
not when they are full.
Adequacy: The behavior selection mechanism must
operate in such a way that the long term goals that
the robot designer has for the robot are met|e.g.,
a oor cleaning robot should successfully clean the
oor in normal circumstances, besides doing all the
ancillary tasks that are necessary for it to be suc-
cessful at that.
Representation: Multiple behaviors might want to
share partial representations of the world|in fact
the representations of world aspects might generate
multiple behaviors when activated appropriately.
Learning: The performance of a robot might be im-
proved by adapting the ways in which behaviors
interact, or are activated, as a result of experience.
When many behavior-based robots start to interact
there are a whole new host of issues which arise. Many of
these same issues would arise if the robots were built us-
ing traditional Articial Intelligence methods, but there
has been very little published in these areas.
Emergence: Given a set of behaviors programmed into
a set of robots, we would like to be able to predict
what the global behavior of the system will be, and
as a consequence determine the dierential eects
of small changes to the individual robots on the
global behavior.
Synthesis: As at single behavior level, given a partic-
ular task, automatically derive a program for the
set of robots so that they carry out the task.
Communication: Performance may be increased by
increasing the amount of explicit communication
between robots, but the relationship between the
amount of communication increase and perfor-
mance increase needs to be understood.
Cooperation: In some circumstances robots should be
able to achieve more by cooperating|the form and
specication of such possible cooperations need to
be understood.
Interference: Robots may interfere with one another.
Protocols for avoiding this when it is undesirable
must be included in the design of the creatures'
instructions.
Density dependence: The global behavior of the sys-
tem may be dependent on the density of the crea-
tures and the resources they consume within the
world. A characterization of this dependence is de-
sirable. At the two ends of the spectrum it may
be the case that (a) a single robot given n units
of time performs identically to n robots each given
1 unit of time, and (2) the global task might not
be achieved at all if there are fewer than, say, m
robots.
Individuality: Robustness can be achieved if all robots
are interchangeable. A xed number of classes of
robots, where all robots within a class are identical,
is also robust, but somewhat less so. The issue
then is to, given a task, decide how many classes of
creatures are necessary
Learning: The performance of the robots may increase
in two ways through learning. At one level, when
one robot learns some skill if might be able to trans-
fer it to another. At another level, the robots might
learn cooperative strategies.
These are a rst cut at topics of interest within
behavior-based approaches. As we explore more we will
nd more topics, and some that seem interesting now
will turn out to be irrelevant.
6.7 Thinking
Can this approach lead to thought? How could it? It
seems the antithesis of thought. But we must ask rst,
what is thought? Like intelligence this is a very slippery
concept.
We only know that thought exists in biological sys-
tems through our own introspection. At one level we
identify thought with the product of our consciousness,
but that too is a contentious subject, and one which has
had little attention from Articial Intelligence.
My feeling is that thought and consciousness are epi-
phenomena of the process of being in the world. As
the complexity of the world increases, and the complex-
ity of processing to deal with that world rises, we will
see the same evidence of thought and consciousness in
our systems as we see in people other than ourselves
now. Thought and consciousness will not need to be
programmed in. They will emerge.
7 Conclusion
The title of this paper is intentionally ambiguous.
The following interpretations all encapsulate important
points.
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 An earlier paper [Brooks 91a]
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was titled Intel-
ligence without Representation. The thesis of that
paper was that intelligent behavior could be gen-
erated without having explicit manipulable inter-
nal representations. Intelligence without Reason is
thus complementary, stating that intelligent behav-
ior can be generated without having explicit rea-
soning systems present.
 Intelligence without Reason can be read as a state-
ment that intelligence is an emergent property of
certain complex systems|it sometimes arises with-
out an easily identiable reason for arising.
 Intelligence without Reason can be viewed as a
commentary on the bandwagon eect in research
in general, and in particular in the case of Arti-
cial Intelligence research. Many lines of research
have become goals of pursuit in their own right,
with little recall of the reasons for pursuing those
lines. A little grounding occasionally can go a long
way towards helping keep things on track.
 Intelligence without Reason is also a commentary
on the way evolution built intelligence|rather
than reason about how to build intelligent systems,
it used a generate and test strategy. This is in stark
contrast to the way all human endeavors to build
intelligent systems must inevitably proceed. Fur-
thermore we must be careful in emulating the re-
sults of evolution|there may be many structures
and observable properties which are suboptimal or
vestigial.
We are a long way from creating Articial Intelli-
gences that measure up the to the standards of early
ambitions for the eld. It is a complex endeavor and
we sometimes need to step back and question why we
are proceeding in the direction we are going, and look
around for other promising directions.
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